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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The front page caption contains the names of all parties involved in this dispute. 
Only plaintiffs and defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. are parties to this appeal. 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Nature of Case 2 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts 2 
Statement of Facts 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
L The court of appeals erred in concluding that it lacked appellate 
jurisdiction over a pre-trial denial of Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment where the question presented in the pre-trial motion could 
not be raised at trial 8 
A. The issue of duty is a threshold question of law for the trial court alone 
to decide 8 
B. The Court of Appeals' opinion conflicts with established Utah law. . 13 
II. Hanson was not required to re-raise the issue of duty of care in order to 
preserve appellate review 16 
A. Factors relating to Duty are not evidentiary or trial issues 16 
B. Jury instructions do not address factors relating to duty 19 
C. Rule 50 requires a motion be made at trial on issues presented 
at trial, no reason exists to extend that reasoning to issues not 
presented at trial 20 
iii 
CONCLUSION 22 
ADDENDUM 
Statements of Material Fact and Plaintiffs Responses 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment 
Trial Court's Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment 
Jury Instructions 
Ct. of App. Opin.: Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2007 UT App 382 
Copy of Prince, Yeates, and Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179 
Copy of Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHOR!! UN-
CASES 
/,
**
c
 Salt Indus.. Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 
9 4 1 !' M '!-"• ' '*' • '• t i l l 1 <><>-'• 
Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 48 P.3d 968 ^ 
Brown > rgensen, 2006 ITT App 168. 136 P.3d 1252 
,'.., I. hAltLlL - ' ' * 1 
.'/..-/' '• ' ? ' : . '••'• •• J : P.2u UUH vJtah 1966) i / 
Herrera v. Quality Pontine. 73 P.3d 18! (N.M. 200.V 
Lee v. Farmer s Kurai hlcain t ,'operative Corp.,. i.~ .-. ,. -)9 
(Kv. Ci \w ^ 'o- ' . |i; 
L/tf/e v. Ite/j State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2J 4v ^Uioh .98J, 17, 19, 20 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc.. 2007 UT App 382 7 1R 
L . . . . . . •<_ / ( / . wit : • > 
Rinchan ex. re I. ('oinhs \. Iir\ - .rid Cirh Cluh nfChul: l't\r.i. ;4 Cal Rptr. nl '>" 
(Cal. Lust. Ct. App. 2005; 
Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, 67 P.3d 1017 
Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987) 
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 144 P.3d 1147 
Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, 143 P.3d 283 
Hthoh , ,' ,in. • raeifie I' ," , i, \- !,| I ' »> ,'H'll, t ,, I1111 , ) 
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283 I .1 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a) 1 
Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 20-21 
Model Utah Jury Instruction 3.1, et seq 7,19 
TREATISES AND LAW REVIEW 
E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational 
Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1 8-10, 19 
VI 
J [JRISDICTIONAL a i A i KMENT 
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Stand ard of Rev ie \ t : '" On certiorari, w J review iik decision of the court of 
appeaj s^ n o j | j i e (jeQision of the trial coi in: t Ii i doing so this c :>i n: I: adopt 5 tl ie sai n 5 
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and tik i.n;i v otu;;, kiuauu inklings are reversed "i< - •; cl^ai iy erroneous." 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
None are dispositive of the issues on appeal. A copy of a portion of the relevant 
jury instructions given to the jury are attached in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
This is a wrongful death action, which arose when a tow truck driver, Dennis 
Normandeau, was killed while unbolting the driveline of a Ryder rental truck that he was 
going to tow. Plaintiffs brought this action against numerous defendants, including 
Hanson Equipment. Hanson repaired a hydraulic hose in the truck prior to the trip during 
which the truck broke down. Plaintiffs alleged that Hanson negligently repaired the 
hydraulic hose which caused the truck to become disabled. The issues in the case were as 
follows: (1) did Hanson owe a duty of care to the tow truck driver; (2) was Hansonfs 
repair the proximate cause of Normandeau's death; and (3) were Normandeau's own acts 
in preparing to tow the Ryder truck an intervening negligent act that broke the chain of 
causation? Hanson submitted a motion for summary judgment on these issues. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts 
Notwithstanding whether its repair was negligent, Hanson brought a motion for 
summary in which it argued that it owed no duty of care to a remote tow truck driver and 
that its repair was not Ihe proximate cause of the Normandeau's death. The trial court 
denied Hanson's motion. The trial court's order denying Hanson's motion for summary 
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judgment provided no basis for the denial, did not indicate that issues of fact precluded 
entry of summary judgment, and simply stated: "Hanson Equipment Inc.'s Motion for 
Summary Judgment is Denied." See Order, attached in Addendum. 
Because the issue of whether a duty of care is owed is a legal issue for the trial 
court to decide and the trial court denied Hanson's motion without finding that any issues 
of fact precluded summary judgment, Hanson did not argue the legal issue of duty to the 
jury. The jury found in favor of plaintiffs on their negligence claim. Hanson then timely 
appealed the issues presented in its motion for summary judgment, and the appeal was 
poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The main issue on appeal was the trial court's denial of Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment. In other words, Hansen asked the Court of Appeals to review 
whether the trial court pre-trial rulings were correct. Rather than addressing the merits of 
the issues, the Court of Appeals determined it had no jurisdiction to review the denial of a 
summary judgement motion after a trial on the merits. Judge Orme dissented on this 
issue. This Court granted Certiorari on the issues of whether appellate courts have 
jurisdiction to review pre-trial rulings and whether a pre-trial issue must be re-raised at 
trial in order to preserve it for appeal. 
Statement of Facts 
This matter arises after Hanson Equipment performed repairs on a hydraulic hose 
in a Ryder rental truck. (R. at 181-94) The Ryder rental truck broke down shortly after 
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the repairs, requiring a tow truck to come and tow the vehicle. (R. at 181-94) While 
preparing to tow the Ryder truck, the tow truck driver was killed when he was undoing 
the bolts that secured the truck's driveline. (R. at 181-94) Plaintiffs filed a complaint 
against numerous defendants, including Hanson. (R. at 181-194) Against Hanson, 
plaintiffs' sole cause of action was for negligence, stating that Hanson negligently 
repaired the truck that caused it "to break down under circumstances that required it to be 
towed." (R. at 181-194) 
A central issue in the case was whether Hanson, who repaired the truck, owed a 
duty of care to a remote tow truck driver who was killed while performing his job of 
towing a disabled vehicle. (R. at 612-748) In other words, assuming Hanson negligently 
repaired the truck, did creating the condition that necessitated a tow truck create a duty of 
care running between Hanson and the tow truck driver? (R. at 612-748) Before the trial 
court, Hanson presented a motion for summary judgment on this issue, arguing that it 
owed no duty of care to a tow truck driver who was injured while preparing to tow the 
disabled truck. (R. at 612-748) 
With respect to Hanson's statement of material facts in support of its motion for 
summary judgment, plaintiffs did not dispute paragraphs 1-4, 5.d., 8, 10-18, or 22-26. (R. 
at 831.) These undisputed facts established the relationship of the parties, and how the 
decedent was killed. (R. at 619-23) Specifically, the undisputed facts established that 
Hanson repaired one of the truck's hydraulic lines; a hydraulic line failed, disabling the 
truck; decedent was called to tow the disabled truck; and decedent was killed as he was 
4 
preparing to tow the truck when the driveline hit him in the head. (R. at 619-23, 831, 
attached in addendum). The facts setting forth the parties1 relationship are all of the facts 
necessary to resolve the issue of whether Hanson owed the decedent a duty of care.1 
A hearing was held on Hanson's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 2078: 28-
54). During this hearing, the trial court never expressed any concerns that disputed issues 
of fact precluded summary judgment in the case. (R. at 2078: 28-54, attached in 
addendum). The trial court looked at foreseeability and the nexus between Hanson's 
repair and the injury. (R. at 2078: 35-36,43,45,47) During oral argument, however, 
neither party suggested that the trial court should reserve its ruling on the issue of duty 
until trial. (R. at 2078: 28-54) Even plaintiffs counsel discussed that the issue of duty was 
a legal issue for the trial court to decide before trial. (R. at 2078: 48). Plaintiffs counsel 
instructed the trial court that duty was a threshold legal issue for the court to decide as a 
matter of law, and the issues of proximate cause and intervening cause were factual issues 
to be resolved by the jury. (R. at 2078: 48) On this point, plaintiffs counsel stated: "Duty 
is decided by the Court, as a matter of law. I don't think there's an issue here that the jury 
needs to decide. This is - ought to be decided by the Judge, by the Court, whether or not 
1
 As to those facts that plaintiffs did dispute, the facts were not material to the issue 
of whether a duty of care was owed. Specifically, plaintiffs' only dispute related what 
Normandeau knew about towing procedures and what he may have done to cause the 
accident. (R. at 831fl[5.a., b , & a ) , 833 fl[6-7), 834 fl[19), 835 fl[20), 837 fl[21), 838 
(f 28)). The remaining disputed paragraphs concern opinions as to who was liable for the 
accident and are not material facts. (R. at 834 fl[9), 837 fl[27), 838 (Iff 28, 29), 839 (f 30), 
840(H31)). 
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there's a duty." (R. at 2078: 48 (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the parties and the trial 
court all contemplated that the issue of duty would be decided by the trial court as a pre-
trial ruling. 
Ultimately, the trial court's ruling was based on its perception that the allegedly 
negligent repair created a dangerous situation for the tow truck driver. (R. at 2078: 38, 
53-54). In its ruling, the trial court summarized, stating: "based on my understanding of 
mechanics, it just seems to me that the failure of the hose exposes the tow truck driver 
who's got to disconnect, if he's going to tow, the drive shaft, to a hazardous situation." 
(R. at 2078:54). 
Following the hearing, the trial court's Order on Hanson's motion, stated: "Hanson 
Equipment Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied." (R. at 1182-86, attached in 
addendum) Hanson appealed the trial court's denial of its summary judgment motion on 
the issue of whether it owed a duty of care. At trial, the jury was only instructed as to 
general principals of negligence that did not relate to duty. Specifically, the jury was only 
instructed as to the general law of negligence, MUJI 3.1, et seq., attached in the 
addendum. (R. at 1514-68, 2077) The jury was not given any instruction that would 
relate to the legal conclusion of duty. 
Rather than addressing the merits of Hanson's argument on whether a duty of care 
was owed, the Utah Court of Appeals, with Judge Orme dissenting on the issue, avoided 
the merits of the argument and stated that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the issue 
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because the trial in the cas^ ' rrrloso(i :jnnolKr n-* / t * ">. 
motion. See Normandcau v. Hans* Inc., 2007 LH >\pp 38.* at * 
SU M M A R i ufr A K ^ l VihlM ' - '-• i LI) KhLlhfr 
Before the Utah Coi u t of Appeals I lanson challenged se veral of the ti ial c -oi it t s 
pre-trial rulings. ' Fhe basic theme of Hanson's appeal was that this case should not have 
been allowed to go to trial. Central among the issues on appeal was the trial court's denia'l 
purely legal issue of whether Hanson owed the decedent a duty of care. 
Rather than addressing the merits oi I lansou .> m^uon ior summary judgment, the 
I ' .ml ni Appr/1,!", ,'i.it, liiilnl i!! ImU'kn) |urr>du linn I,, i n in,v Ihr ilnnul \\\ a motion l.ir 
summary judgment after a trial on the merits. In this case, however, the issue of whether 
Hanson owed a aui> ^i care was a threshold k:;al issue that the trial court alone was 
as x i 
was not presented to the jury, furthermore, the facts relevant to whether a duty of care 
was owed were not in dispute, nor did the trial court make any findings that disputed facts 
and no facts were in dispute, the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review the issue and erred when it concluded that the issue was presented 
In tin" (in ' and runlet! In lie rrnrurd al liial in nrdn In prcst'i'vc .ippellak1 |unsdii'lhni. 
Hanson is requesting this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals and require 
appellate review of threshold pre-trial rulings on a legal issue where no issues of fact are 
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in dispute and where the trial court does not reserve its ruling on the issue. Also, Hanson 
is requesting that this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Hanson was 
required to re-raise issues in its summary judgment motion at trial in order to preserve the 
pre-trial legal issue for appeal. In summary, Hanson is requesting this Court to reinforce 
its prior rulings that Utah's appellate courts have jurisdiction to make sure the trial court 
got the law right. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The court of appeals erred in concluding that it lacked appellate 
jurisdiction over a pre-trial denial of Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment where the question presented in the pre-trial motion could 
not be raised at trial. 
A. The issue of duty is a threshold question of law for the trial court alone 
to decide. 
In discussing the "knotty and confusing" problems presented by traditional 
negligence terms, Professor Thode noted at the outset: "the allocation of functions 
between judge and jury plays an important part." E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-
Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and 
Jury, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1,1. Later Professor Thode stated: "In the division of functions 
between judge and jury, the duty issue is an issue of law for the court." Id, at 13. 
Since Professor Thode's article in 1977, Utah's appellate courts have consistently 
held that the issue of duty is a legal conclusion for the court, not the jury, to decide. See 
Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80,1J9, 125 P.3d 906; Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT 
8 
' \ P r ' " «x r> 7 |\3d l()l V ^"whether a duty of care is owed is'entirely j) ;nestionof law to 
he determined h\ the coin Moreover, this Court recently discussed Put because "one 
may not be liable to another in tort absc... .. *u;.. u.... * jrv ai.^i}.^ ..:•... iim 
begins with an nu. uto the existence and scope of the duty owed the plaintiff by the 
defendai it." "• < •. ttoodsideHomes Corp., 2006 I T -i"\ «*• i "4/ P \\ 283. 
Accordingly under mi:, v otii tJ"s analysis "[the question • •-. .idi.u a legal duty exists] is 
the first question to be answered " Id at f 14 
Based on this well established body of law, Hanson filed a pre-trial moiU MI for 
summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty of care to the decedent as a mat.*.. < .. ' In 
would not be presented to the uirv: ,s[ don't think there's an issue here that the jury needs 
tockudo. \h . t v I* it.i court denied ii .L u 4ion and did not tmd any 
otherwise indicate that it wanted inrther briefing or evidence in order to make its 
decision. Consistent with the governing Utah law, the parties and the trial court 
i ecognized the issi le of di it) vv as a thr eshold legal issi le tl ial: w as presented, argued, ai id 
ruled upon. 
According! \, the parties and the trial .-^u-t recognized that the issue of duty was a 
pr :::: ti ial legal issi le foi the coi n It t : • decide \ bsent a di it;; of cai • s. tl le case coi ild it lot gc • to 
the jury. Thus, the trial court ruled on this issue before trial. At trial, the issue of duty 
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was not presented, and the jury was not instructed on the issue. As Professor Thode 
noted: ""keep in mind that the instruction to the jury did not inform it in any 
understandable way that it was making a decision about the scope of the law's protection 
in the case at issue, nor did the court inform the jury about the policies by which its 
decision would be tested." Thode, 1977 Utah Law Rev. 1 at p. 18. 
The reason the question of duty is a legal question that must be decided by the 
court as a threshold matter is that it is based primarily on policy judgments applied to the 
parties' relationship. See Yazd, 2006 UT 47 at f 17. Thus, in order for the court to render 
a decision as to whether the law permits a duty to arise, "a court must understand that the 
structure and dynamics of the relationship between the parties gives rise to the duty." Id. 
at f 14. As a general principal, "[a] relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely to 
be accompanied by a duty than one, for example, in which the parties are in privity of 
contract." Id. Depending upon how attenuated the parties' relationship is, the court may 
be "called upon to make policy choices based on assessment of social, economic, and 
technological conditions." Id. at ^[19. Thus, this Court summarized a court's obligation 
with respect to this threshold legal question: "When policy considerations bear on a 
subject lodged firmly within the court's sphere, like the common law, it is entirely 
appropriate for the court to make the policy judgments necessary to get the law right." Id. 
at 1f20. 
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Notwithstanding tl lese consideratioi is the Cc 1 n I: of A ppeals conch ided the 
following: (1) the issue of duty was presented at trial, (2) Hanson should have renewed its 
mouon a! u u; . ;. tnc i.ssuv. w.;
 xuu*. jik.. • * i lie court kuKcd juijoviiciiwj. .* icview a pre-
that effectively prevents appellate review of pre-trial rulings, 'I lie Court of Appeals' 
conclusion essentially abdicates its role as an appellate court and prevents any sort of 
review the trial court's pre-trial ruling as to whether the law recognized a duty in this case. 
.-*er won\« idii^ wu a^kcd UK. \ ouii o\ Appeals to Un>k at whether the trial court got 
1
 ' • it I Jtah* Hate c • :>iii ts 
lack jurisdiction to review a trial court's pre-trial legal rulings. 
A* to tlh. i vsuc oi uiu\ in mis case, the parties presented undisputed facts about the 
JunciioL, Colorado. Among other things, Hanson repairs large trucks. The decedent was 
a tow truck driver., based out of Price, Utah. The parties' paths crossed when a h »ek that 
parties' relationship was "highly attenuated" and "less likely to be accompanied by a legal 
di ity M Yazd, 2006 LIT 47 at 116. 
Because tl le nati it : of tl ic pai ties' i elatioi isl lij: did i lot si if: poi I: ai i ofr rioi is ii it) of 
care, the trial court was then required to look at policy considerations in order to 
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determine whether a duty at law existed, and if it did exist, the scope and nature of the 
duty owed. In summary, the question facing the trial court was: Given the attenuated 
relationship between a repair shop in Colorado and a tow truck driver in Utah, did the 
surrounding policy considerations warrant finding the existence of a legal duty of care? 
In addition to the policy considerations, this Court has also looked at the positions 
of the parties as it related to parity of knowledge. See Yazd, 2006 UT 47 at fl22-26. 
Often, parity of knowledge relates to the duty to disclose knowledge from one party to 
another because of one party's superior position to know facts that would be material to 
the actions of the other. See id. at f23. In that circumstance, a duty may exist and then 
end when a party acquires that knowledge from another source. See id. 
Applying these considerations to the undisputed facts of this case required the trial 
court to make the following considerations in ruling on Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment: (1) did Hanson owe the decedent a legal duty to properly repair the truck?; (2) 
did Hanson possess superior knowledge that it had a duty to disclose to the decedent?; (3) 
did any policy considerations, either social, economic, or technological, support the 
existence of a duty of care? Hanson argued that it owed the decedent no duty to properly 
repair the truck,2 that it did not possess any superior knowledge as to how to tow the 
truck, and that no policy considerations supported a duty running from a repair shop to a 
2
 Indeed, the decedent's business relies on trucks breaking down and needing to be 
towed. 
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remote and unknown tow truck di iver 1 1 le ti ial coi n t disagreed A ftei a ti ial ii i \ < I iicl 1 
none of these issues were presented to a jury, Hanson requested appellate review of 
whethe. inc trial court's legal conclusion that a duty existed was correct, in * om i -i 
Appeals, however, determined it coi iid not i evie\* the issi le. 
B . T h e Court of Appeals 1 opinion conflicts with established U t a h law. 
In contrast to the Coui t of Appeals ' decision in this case, this Coui t has recently 
reviewed a trial conit ' i pic tn.il iiiniliii!" and \ aea l rd ,i |iiii , AW ml bemuse the In il i nun1 
erroneous ruling allow cci • . am to go to the jury. In Prince. Yeates & Geldzahler )\ 
Young. . = » : ..».<» , iirm asserted chums against one of its associates. 
Like this casr •"•••• ' ' ^ •* • --: :*-- l': ^ soc ia l r o w n ! Ih. Iinti 
a legal duty. Before trial, the law h im moved for partial summary judgment , arguing that 
its associate owed i!i<. un\ iirm a duty ol u n e , and the associate also moved for partial 
SMI " I ' l t ' i " . 
firm's motion, finding no duty was owed, and the case proceeded to trial. At a ial, a - •'•* 
awarded the associak >2NO.000. 
O n appea l lln I iw I M I I I ' ippea lcd Ihe d i a l enui'l1^ n ie ln . i l i m i II111;» niiiii mils' M in ium II m 
summary judgment 01 1 the issue of duty. If the trial COUIL'IS ruling was wroni! the 
associate's claims should not have been presented at trial, This Court rex erscd the trial 
coi n It 01 l tl: le issi te of di i/lh : f ::ai • :: am: id "\ acated the ji n ;; "s a A- ai d to tl le i tss< n at ne. |,« > te 
Prince, Yeates, 2004 U I 26 at f 24] 
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The relief granted by this Court in the Prince, Yeates opinion is the precise relief 
sought by Hanson in this case. Hanson argued the trial court erred in its legal conclusion 
with respect to whether it owed a duty of care. Absent a duty of care, plaintiffs' case 
should not have gone to trial, and the jury?s verdict could not stand. In short, Hanson 
argued the case should have never made it to the jury. Hanson requested the Court of 
Appeals review the trial court's pre-trial decision to allow the case to go to the jury as a 
matter of law. 
The Court of Appeals' decision to conclude that it did not have jurisdiction to 
review a pre-trial ruling on a motion for summary judgment conflicts with the Prince, 
Yeates decision. In addition to be contrary to Prince, Yeates, the Court of Appeals' 
opinion in this case conflicts with other opinions from this Court. Specifically, in 
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, f 20, 144 P.3d 1147, this Court held that issues raised 
in motion for partial summary judgment and that could not be addressed at trial may be 
appealed and reviewed by an appellate court. As set forth above, the legal and policy 
considerations that surround the question of whether the law recognizes a duty are not 
trial issues. The jury makes no findings relative to the issue, and the jury is not instructed 
as to the law of duty. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case conflicts 
with this Court's precedent in Wayment. 
In addition to being contrary to these opinions, the Court of Appeals' opinion 
creates a difficult situation in which a party will be forced to either guess as to what may 
14 
be sufficient to preserve an issue and/or be forced to raise and re-raise the issue at 
multiple stages of the case in order to preserve appellate jurisdiction to review the issue. 
court's resources, as indies will be forced to revisit prior rulings. This Court has 
previously articulated a simplei. more workable standard. In Brookside Mobile Home 
i 
counsel has raised an issue before the trial com t, and the trial court has considered the 
issue, the issue is preserved for appeal ,# The Brookside standaid is a better standard than 
:.. .: . \> case nn< ;-: ........ .* .. > \.ic siana.;u! mai r ,o\c; 'ned 
this ease. Hanson was entitled to rely on Prince, Yeates, Wayment, and Brookside in 
order to determine if it had properly preserved its arguments for appeal. 
. . . I . ' . . . . , . ; n ; c a L opinion ^unw^L, \*itn prior p r e c e d e s n o m a 
differed panel ol iu> -. n; • ••- .;. ,r . - • -t-.J •• * - ' h ' 
was whether the trial court, improperly allowed, plaintiffs to designate an untinielv. and. 
una , >LJU:>^; ?-,•• ing expert in opposition to Harmon's mo*n^ :.>r nummaryjudgmen r™ 
Brown v. j jv/--~-- - • - p ** 
Appeals reviewed the denial of partial summary judgment motion after trial on merits 
where one of tl: ic issues on appeal was review of a motion to slr.KC an improper ailhiavit 
i ised to oppose a pre ti ial i i lotioi i If ai i.. appellate coi 1.1 1: cai 11 e> ie \ v x\ lietl lei 01 nc t a 
motion to strike was properly or improperly granted, it must also retain jurisdiction to 
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apply its ruling on the motion to strike to the motion for summary judgment where the 
affidavit was used in support or in opposition. Otherwise, an appellate court could find 
an affidavit was improperly used to oppose a motion for summary judgment, but then it 
could not review the effects of the affidavit because it lacked jurisdiction to review the 
motion for summary judgment. 
In summary, a bright line rule that prohibits appellate review of a pre-trial motion 
for summary judgment is unworkable. Utah's appellate courts need jurisdiction to review 
pre-trial rulings in order to ensure that the trial court got "the law right." Hanson is 
requesting this Court to correct the Court of Appeals' erroneous conclusion that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Hanson 
only petitioned for Certiorari on the issue of whether the Court of Appeals could review 
the trial court's ruling on the legal issue of duty. In articulating a standard, however, 
Hanson would argue that in certain instances other threshold legal issues could be 
reviewed after a trial on the merits. This Court has issued many opinions that allow for 
grants of summary judgment on questions that are usually fact sensitive, but based on the 
facts of the case, may be disposed of as a matter of law. 
II. Hanson was not required to re-raise the issue of duty of care in order to 
preserve appellate review. 
A. Factors relating to Duty are not evidentiary or trial issues. 
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' opinion, the factors relating to whether a duty of 
care was owed were not trial issues and were not presented to the jury. The trial court 
16 
rather than IIK- T»-V must decide questions of law as distinguished !•••:• <.--
wliij ih are left for the jury. See Hall v. Blackham, 417 P.2d 664 (Utah i ^-> i; .4 MS .Vc/f 
Industries, la< Itti^ncsitim ( orporalion oj lmcrican{)41 I V . M . U J , U") (I Hall l'W/). 
In Utah, ihe question of whether a duty oi care rxi * 
decided by the trial coun See AMS Salt Industries^ 942 P 2d al ^ I(). II University 
. . . . . , . < . : j \, , . « ^ 6 7 R 3 d 
iox/. ilansoii Cuuid not have explieiu d-wHhr 
denial o r its iv ii i. for summary judgment on that issue, In denying its summary 
JU^L,HH ... . .,;. ^.„rt determined thai 1 lanson owed a duty of care as a matter 
0 f iaw^ thereby resolving the i s - •;: \ I hie s hold 11 \ < 111 n . 
The Court of Appeals' opinion was premised on its belief that because 
foreseeability goes to tne issu, ,-s Ju(> than duty becomes a trial issue. This Court has 
previouslydeten-Tin : • • <.• .-.- - •* >certaining 
whether a duty of care exists. See AMS Salt Industries, 942 l\2d at 321. "Whether the 
],!.•• ; mposes a duty does not depend upon foreseeability alone. The likelihood of in jury, 
the magnitude of Hir IHIM)I II O* cii;iii(iii)» a^ain^' M ;M"1 H " <»'M''|!iiMuvk> "l plat1"""1" 'I' i" 
burden upon defendant, must also be taken into account. Little v. C/to/r State Div. of 
Family ,V/T/< C>. <• > . .1 4V. :>4-;o (Utah 1983). The existence of a duty of care "may 
also be foi iiicl oi i. tl le basis of i easoi lable i i n iti lal i eliai ice • oh n itai ) c oi icii ict w 1 ii ::1 i 
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increases the risk of harm, and general policy considerations." AMS Salt Industries, 942 
P.2dat321. 
Despite prior Utah law holding that the issue of duty of care must be determined 
by the trial court and, that foreseeability is not the only factor relevant to ascertaining 
duty, two judges of the Court of Appeals determined that the issue of duty is "heavily 
fact-sensitive" and should have been presented to the jury because it is "intertwined with 
the issue of foreseeability." See Normandeau, 2007 UT App 382 at ^[14. This 
determination came after the Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged that the issue of 
duty is "technically an issue of law." Id. Nevertheless, two judges determined that the 
issue of foreseeability was presented to the jury and was decided against Hanson and thus 
Hanson "was accorded the opportunity to fully litigate [its] case." See id. 
At the summary judgment stage in this case, the trial court did not find any issues 
of fact which precluded a ruling on whether a duty of care was owed, thus the issue was 
not reserved for judgment at trial. Moreover, the trial court's ruling was not based on 
foreseeability. Even if foreseeability was the determinative issue, courts have also 
recognized that the underlying question of foreseeability, as it relates to a duty of care, is 
a question of law for the courts. See Lee v. Farmer's Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 
245 S.W.3d 209, 218 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); Herrera . Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 186 
(N.M. 2003); Rinehart ex. rel Combs v. Boys and Girls Club ofChula Vista, 34 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 677, 684 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that foreseeability when analyzed to 
18 
determine the scope of duty is a question of law). Since factors relating to whether a duty 
of care is owed are not presented to a jury, Hanson could not have explicitly raised the 
issue of duty of care at trial. 
B, Jury instructions do not address factors relating to duty. 
Assuming that evidence was presented at trial that related to whether a duty of care 
was owed, the jury instructions on negligence do not address any of the factors that a trial 
court must consider in determining whether the law imposes a duty of care, and the jury 
made no findings to assist the trial court in its decision. Compare MUJI 3.1, et seq. 
(setting forth juryfs consideration of issue of negligence), with Little, 667 P.3d at 54-55 
(discussing factors for determining duty) and Thode, 1977 Utah Law Rev. 1 at 28 ('The 
determination of the issue of duty and whether it includes the particular risk imposed on 
the victim ultimately rests upon the broad policies which underlie the law. These policies 
may be characterized generally as morality, the economic good of the group, practical 
administration of the law, justice as between the parties and other considerations relative 
to the environment out of which the case arose."). The multitude of factors which 
contribute toward the finding of duty are complex and overlapping are not conducive to 
being reduced to jury instructions. It is not the jury's role to determine the scope of the 
law's protection; the jury's role is to determine issues of fact. It is up to the Court alone 
to say whether or not the law provides a duty of care. 
19 
In summary, "[a] court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is 'an 
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say 
that the plaintiff is [or is not] entitled to protection.'" Id; (citing Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 
2005 UT 80,1f9, 15 P.3d 906 (quoting Univ. Of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 
(Colo. 1987)). Juries are not in the same position to make these social and moral policy 
based decisions as are judges. Thus, the Court of Appeals1 conclusion that the issue of 
duty was raised at trial was erroneous. 
C. Rule 50 requires a motion be made at trial on issues presented at trial, 
no reason exists to extend that reasoning to issues not presented at trial. 
The Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that by failing to move for 
"dismissal" at trial, Hanson failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Apparently, a motion 
for "dismissal" should have taken the form of a Rule 50 motion. A motion for directed 
verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made pursuant to Rule 50 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are made based on the evidence presented at trial. 
Utah Rule Civ. P. 50. According to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, "[n]ot every 
denial of a motion for summary judgment requires a subsequent Rule 50 motion in order 
to be appealable." Wilson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 56 F.3d 1226, 1239 (10th Cir. 
1995) (reviewing pre-trial negligence ruling after trial). A critical distinction exists 
between summary judgment motions which raise the sufficiency of the evidence to create 
a fact question for the jury and those raising a question of law that the court must decide. 
See id. Appellate review of a motion for summary judgment based on an issue of law is 
20 
proper even if the case proceeds to trial and the moving party does not make a subsequent 
Rule 50 motion. See id. No Rule 50 motion is required to preserve the issue when the 
issue was a question of law for the court to decide. See id. 
The trial court properly treated the issue of duty as a threshold legal issue. Utah 
law foreclosed the issue of duty from being reargued at trial since the trial court had 
already ruled on that issue as a matter of law. Hanson could not have moved for a 
directed verdict or for "dismissal/1 as reasoned by Court of Appeals, on the issue of 
whether a duty of care was owed since evidence was not and could not have been 
presented on the issue of duty at the trial. A Rule 50 motion for directed verdict and for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict was not required to preserve the question of law 
previously determined by the trial court. Thus, the Court of Appeals* ruling that Hanson 
failed to preserve the issues for appeal was is erroneous. 
21 
CONCLUSION 
Hanson requests this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals' determination that it 
lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment. Additionally, because the issue of duty was not a trial issue and was not 
presented at trial, Hanson requests this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals' conclusion 
that Hanson failed to preserve the issues in its summary judgment motion for appeal by 
not re-raising the issues at trial. 
DATED this ^ % day of April, 2008. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
ZACHARY E. PETERSON 
)rneys for Defendant Hanson Equipment, 
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INTRODUCTION 
This case arises out of the wrongful death of tow truck driver Dennis 
Normandeau, who died while preparing to tow a Ryder truck that had broken down to the side of 
the road. Among the eight defendants sued in this action is Hanson Equipment, a repair shop 
that had previously serviced the truck. Plaintiffs allege a theory of negligence against Hanson 
Equipment; however, summary judgment is proper because plaintiffs cannot establish two of the 
four elements of a negligence claim: duty and causation. Hanson Equipment owed no duty of 
care to the unforseeable decedent Normandeau, who was an independent, subsequent tow truck 
driver. And, the plaintiffs' "but for" causation theory is too tenuous to assign fault to Hanson 
Equipment as a proximate cause of Normandeau's injury. Normandeau himself was the 
intervening, superceding cause of his own death that broke any chain of "but for" causation to 
Hanson Equipment. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
AS TO WHICH NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS 
1. This lawsuit arises from the death of tow-truck driver Dennis Normandeau.3 
2. Normandeau died on November 10, 2001, during the process of preparing to tow a 
Ryder moving truck that had broken down at the side of the road while atop Soldier Summit in 
Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah.4 
Attached to this Memorandum and marked as Exhibit A is the Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, 
filed September 22, 2003 
4
 See Ex A, Am Compl at ffi[ 32 and 40-43. 
V 
\J Pi 
Normandeau's Training & Experience 
3. Earlier that year, Normandeau had started working for Kenworth Sales Company 
("Kenworth"), a diesel maintenance and repair shop and towing service.5 
4. In May or June 2001, he was transferred into the shop to be the primary wrecker 
driver; when Normandeau wasn't towing trucks, he worked as a mechanic.6 
5. Normandeau's supervisor at Kenworth, Kyle Bundy, who has twenty years' 
wrecking experience, taught Normandeau how to use a large diesel wrecker.7 
a. Mr. Bundy took Normandeau on four practice towing trips.8 
b. Mr. Bundy taught Normandeau how to test whether or not a vehicle has 
any built-up tension in its drive line by first wiggling it to determine whether or not it will 
rotate, or whether it's too tight.9 
c. Mr. Bundy taught Normandeau that if he detected that the driveline was 
not loose, then he needed to relieve the pressure by jacking up the back tire or putting the 
transmission in neutral.10 
5
 Attached to this Memorandum and marked as Exhibit B are pertinent portions of the deposition of Kyle 
Bundy, conducted March 12, 2004, at pages 11 25-13 21 
6
 See Ex B, Bundy Depo at 49 5-19 and 51 19-23 
7
 See Ex B , Bundy Depo at 29 13-16 
8
 Id. at 13 17-14 6, 24 21-25 11, and 47 5-24 
9
 Id. at 25 24-26 7 and 40 11-41 7 
10
 Id_at20 11-22 24 and 25 6-23 
vi 
d. Mr. Bundy watched Normandeau disassemble a driveline following this 
procedure on three or four occasions.11 
6. On average, Noramandeau towed vehicles similar to the Ryder truck three to five 
times a month.12 
7. Mr. Bundy testified it's "Basic Mechanics 101" for wrecker drivers to try to 
wiggle the driveline and if it has tension, to put the truck in neutral and raise the rear tires before 
disassembling it.13 
8. Mr. Bundy testified that if a drive line doesn't wiggle, there is no way to quantify 
how much tension is built up in it, whether it be 100 pounds or 10,000 pounds of pressure.14 
Events Leading up to the Accident 
9. Defendant Hanson Equipment, in Grand Junction, Colorado, is in the business of 
servicing and repairing trucks, including the model involved in this case.15 
10. On November 8, 2001, Hanson Equipment serviced this Ryder truck's hydraulic 
line for the brakes and power steering.16 
11
 Id. at 24 24-26 21 
12
 Id. at 50 21-51 18 
13
 Id. at 26 22-27 13 
14
 See Ex B , Bundy Depo at 59 25-60 18 
See Ex A, Am Compl at ^ 21, see also, Exhibit C, the deposition of Clyde Alberts, conducted May 4, 
2004, at 9 17-21 and 16 6-25 
See Ex A, Am Compl at ^ 30, see also Exhibit D, the deposition of Jeiome Williams, conducted May 
4, 2004, at 21 2-9 
vii 
11. The next day, Kristen Marion rented the truck and planned to drive it to 
Silverdale, Washington, where she was moving her family.17 
12. On November 10, 2001, en route to Washington, and while atop Soldier Summit 
in Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah, the truck's hydraulic line for the brakes and power steering failed, 
and Ms. Marion slowly pulled the truck off to the side of the road.18 
13. Ms. Marion then contacted Ryder Roadside Assistance, who initially dispatched 
tow truck driver Larry Freeman to the scene.19 
14. When Mr. Freeman arrived, he realized that his tow truck was too small to pull 
the Ryder truck.20 
15. Nonetheless, Mr. Freeman thought he might be able to fix the truck, so he 
removed a hose that appeared to be dripping power steering fluid; he called various repair shops 
to find a replacement, but was unable to find one.21 
See Ex. A, Am. Compl at ^] 24-31; see also Exhibit E, the deposition of Kristen Marion, conducted 
March 24, 2005, at 8:24-10:9 and 125.9-21. 
1 O 
See Ex. A, Am. Compl at ^ 32; see also, Ex. E, the Marion Depo, at 84:1-5. 
See Ex. A, Am Compl at ^ 33; see also, Exhibit F, the deposition of Larry Freeman, conducted 
November 18, 2003, at 14:1-17. 
See Ex. A, Am. Compl. atU 34, see also Ex. F, Freeman Depo., at 14.19-15:10. 
21
 See Ex. F, Freeman Depo. at 32:15-33:7 and 39:16-40:13. 
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16. Since he was unable to replace the hose, Kenworth was dispatched to bring a large 
diesel wrecker to tow the truck.22 
17. Kenworth sent wrecker driver Normandeau.23 
18. In order to tow the truck, Normandeau had to disconnect the driveline.24 
19. To disconnect the driveline, Normandeau needed to first relieve any built-up 
torque.25 
20. Unfortunately, Normandeau did not attempt to wiggle the driveline to check for 
any built up tension.26 
21. Instead of checking for any torque build up, Normandeau started to remove the 
four bolts from the yoke that connects the driveline to the rear differential.27 
22. Unfortunately, significant torque had built up m the driveline, and when 
Normandeau had removed the third bolt only about an eighth of an inch, the driveline broke free, 
suddenly striking Normandeau in the head, killing him.28 
See Ex F, Freeman Depo at 41 3-42 1, see also, photograph of the Ryder truck and diesel wrecker, 
attached as an exhibit to the Freeman Depo , and included in Ex F 
See Ex A, Am Compl at 1| 33, see also Ex F, Fieeman Depo at 42 2-9 
See Ex A, Am Compl at ^ 37 
See Ex A, Am Compl at ^ 40, see also, Ex F, Freeman Depo at 96 11-25 
See Ex F, Freeman Depo at 97 1-3, see also, Ex E, Mai ion Depo at 101 13-1026 
See Ex F photographs from Freemen Depo That show the driveline and the Ryder truck and 
Ken worth's wreckei 
28
 See Ex F, Freeman Depo at 103 21-104 4 and 105 5-25 
IX 
23. Mr. Freeman reached over and grabbed Normandeau's head before it hit the 
ground, and realized Normandeau was dead.29 
After the Accident 
24. After the police arrived, another tow truck driver, Landon Jacobson, was called to 
the scene to finish towing the truck.30 
25. Mr. Jacobson never learned why the truck was being towed; nonetheless, he 
towed the truck, using Normandeau's wrecker, without incident.31 
26. Mr. Jacobson, who had five years' towing experience, testified that before a tow 
he always checks the driveline to see if there is any built-up tension in it before he disassembles 
it.32 
27. When Mr. Jacobson was asked his opinion regarding why this accident happened, 
he testified "obviously there was pressure on the driveline, so I guess that wasn't checked.,.."33 
28. When asked if he had ever read that built-up tension in a driveline can kill you, 
Mr. Jacobson replied, "It is just kind of-for mechanics, mechanic eveiyday kind of knowledge, I 
"34 
guess. 
29 
See Ex. F, Freeman Depo. at 48:5-15. 
30
 See Ex. B, Bundy Depo. at 41:17-42:1. 
See Ex. G, Jacobson Depo. at 16:10-17:6. 
32
 See Ex. G, Jacobson Depo. at 30:1-13, 32:2-6, and 38:15-39:2. 
See Ex. G, Jacobson Depo. at 48:6-22. 
See Ex. G, Jacobson Depo. at 51:1 -9. 
\ r?+\ 
29. Normandeau's supervisor Mr. Bundy believes Normandeau made a mistake by 
not first trying to release and unload the pressure that was built-up in the driveline before he 
attempted to disassemble it.35 
30. When Mr. Bundy was asked, "[W]ho, other than Mr. Normandeau would be 
responsible for his accident?" He answered, "Nobody I know."36 
31. In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege only one theory of liability against 
defendant Hanson Equipment for the negligent repair of the truck, which caused it "to break 
down under circumstances that required it to be towed."37 
35
 See Ex B, Bundy Depo at 27 17-28 2 
36
 See Ex B, Bundy Depo at 56 3-10 
37
 See Ex A, Am Compl at1J59 c 
XI 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this motion, the plaintiffs do not dispute paragraphs 1-4, 5.d, 8, 10-18 
and 22-26 of Hanson's statement of facts. They respond to the other numbered paragraphs as 
follows: 
"5.a. Mr. Bundy took Normandeau on four practice towing trips." 
Response: Although Mr. Bundy and Mr. Normandeau went on four trips together— 
twice where Mr. Bundy was the primary driver and Mr. Normandeau observed, and twice where 
Mr. Normandeau was the primary driver and Mr. Bundy observed, none of those trips involved 
the particular type of truck or braking system involved in this case.1 
"5.b. Mr. Bundy taught Normandeau how to test whether or not a vehicle has any built-
up tension in its drive line by first wiggling it to determine whether or not it will rotate, or 
whether it's too tight." 
Response: The plaintiffs dispute any implication in paragraph 5.b that Mr. 
Normandeau did not test the driveline for built-up tension. Mr. Bundy testified that, by 
"wiggling" the driveline, he meant seeing if it would rotate.2 There are several ways to "wiggle" 
the driveline.3 Mr. Bundy testified that his "preference" for determining whether the driveline 
1
 Dep. of Kyle Bundy, the cited portions of which are attached as exhibit 1, at 
29:22-30:6,47:21-48:1. 
2
 See id at 40:11-14. 
3
 See id at 40:15-22. 
3 
^^Lr—^ I 
was loose or not was "putting a wrench on it and--like you are going to take the bolts out."4 He 
said, "I put my wrench on the bolt and just rock it back and forth.... If it doesn't rock, then I do 
whatever it takes to free it up."5 Mr. Normandeau put his wrench on the bolts, as evidenced by 
the fact that he had removed two of the bolts when the accident happened.6 
"5.c. Mr. Bundy taught Normandeau that if he detected that the driveline was not loose, 
then he needed to relieve the pressure by jacking up the back tire or putting the transmission in 
neutral." 
Response: Mr. Bundy testified that he trained Mr. Normandeau that, if the driveline 
was not loose, he had to "move the truck back or forward"7 or "jack a tire up, or start the engine 
and relieve the brake pressure."8 However, Mr. Bundy further testified that in this case "starting 
the engine would not have done it, because the line had a hole in it, you know, to create the 
4
 Id. at 25:24-26:4. 
5
 Id. at 33:11-18. See also id. at 21:19-22 ("when I put my wrench on the bolt to 
loosen the bolt, if I couldn't move the driveline, I done whatever it took to relieve the tension"). 
6
 E.g., Dep. of Larry Freeman, the cited portions of which are attached as exhibit 2, 
at 46:13-47:4. 
7
 Bundy dep., ex. 1, at 20:20-22. See also id. at 54:15-19. 
8
 Ma t 25:12-23. 
4 
problem to begin with.'"9 Moreover, according to International's safety engineer, moving the 
truck back can actually cause torque in the driveline.10 
"6. On average, Noramandeau [sic] towed vehicles similar to the Ryder truck three to 
five times a month." 
Response: Although Mr. Normandeau had towed similar vehicles before, Mr. Bundy 
did not know whether any of them involved a hydraulic hose that had failed.11 
"7. Mr. Bundy testified it's 'Basic Mechanics 101' for wrecker drivers to try to 
wiggle the driveline and if it has tension, to put the truck in neutral and raise the rear tires before 
disassembling it." 
Response: The quoted phrase is from counsel's question, which was paraphrasing an 
earlier conversation Mr. Bundy had had with counsel for defendant Bendix Commercial Vehicle 
Systems, LLC.12 Although Mr. Bundy and Landon Jacobson, another tow-truck driver, thought it 
was common knowledge how to release pressure on the driveline,13 Larry Freeman, the tow-truck 
driver with the most experience of any of them, testified: 
9
 M a t 28:9-13. 
10
 See Dep. of Richard A. Mink, P.E., the cited portions of which are attached as 
exhibit 3, at 102:14-103:1. 
11
 See Bundy dep., ex. 1, at 64:12-15. 
12
 See id at 27:9-13. 
13
 See Tf 28 & response, infra. 
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There is something I didn't know, and I don't know that if anybody knew 
it. Nobody in that area knew how to release the pressure off of that driveline. 
Nobody had ever been taught. Nobody had ever been-on the truck there is no 
warning around it. In the manual, there is no nothing of it. 
As far as I know, there is no way of releasing that brake, you know, to get 
the tension off. That is a bad situation... ,14 
He later found out that you could release the tension by jacking up the rear wheel, but, he 
said, "[W]e didn't know that. I have been in this business for 32 years. I bet I have dropped, I 
must have dropped 30 of them or better, and I never even thought anything of it."15 
"9. Defendant Hanson Equipment, in Grand Junction, Colorado, is in the business of 
servicing and repairing trucks, including the model involved in this case." 
Response: The repairs involved in this case were made out of Hanson's Glenwood 
Springs, Colorado, location, not its Grand Junction location.16 
"19. To disconnect the driveline, Normandeau needed to first relieve any built-up 
torque" (citing paragraph 40 of the amended complaint and page 96, lines 11-25, of Mr. 
Freeman's deposition). 
Response: This paragraph is not supported by the portions of the record cited. 
Paragraph 40 of the amended complaint alleges that Mr. Normandeau followed normal procedure 
14
 Freeman dep., ex, 2, at 50:19-51:17. 
15
 Id at 52:1-5. 
16
 See, e.g., Dep. of Jerome Williams, the cited portions of which are attached as 
exhibit 4, at 22:20-23:12; 124:12-20. 
6 
in unhooking the driveshaft. The cited portion of Mr. Freeman's deposition says that Mr. 
Normandeau got his wrench and started to drop the driveline by unbolting it. Whether it was 
common knowledge among tow truck drivers like Mr. Normandeau that one has to relieve any 
built-up torque before disconnecting a driveline is a disputed issue of fact.17 Mr. Freeman, who 
has some thirty years' experience towing, testified that he would not have tried to wiggle the 
driveshaft but would have just dropped it.18 
"20. Unfortunately, Normandeau did not attempt to wiggle the driveline to check for 
any built up tension" (citing page 97, lines 1-3, of Mr. Freeman's deposition and page 101, line 
13, to page 102, line 6, of Kristen Marion's deposition). 
Response: Although neither Mr. Freeman nor Ms. Marion remembered seeing Mr. 
Normandeau checking for built-up tension in the driveline, their testimony is not conclusive on 
that matter because neither of them was watching Mr. Normandeau the whole time. Mr. 
Freeman testified as follows: 
Q. Did you ever see him reach over and attempt to wiggle the 
driveline? 
A. No, / don't think he did. 
A. . . . [U]sually on a big outfit, there is no torque on them. 
Q. But you didn't see him do that? 
See response to f^ 7, supra. 
Freeman dep., ex. 2, at 176:5-15. 
7 
A. I don't think he did, but I am not sure. He could have.l9 
Ms. Marion testified that she does not know anything about towing.20 She was standing 
at the back wheels while Mr. Normandeau was under the truck.21 Ms. Marion then turned 
around. She "remember[ed] them doing some stuff," but she was trying to get things ready to 
leave and went back to the car and got in it.22 When asked if she saw Mr. Normandeau try to 
move or wiggle the drive shaft or try to reposition the vehicle, Ms. Marion said, "No," but then 
added, "I didn't pay attention to any of that, no."23 She further testified, "I don't remember the 
actual procedure happening, no."24 
Mr. Normandeau could have checked the driveline for built-up tension.25 The only 
person who knows whether Mr. Normandeau checked for built-up tension is Mr. Normandeau, 
and he is dead. 
19
 Id at 97:1-3, 9-13 (emphasis added). See also id at 42:24-43:1 ("I am not sure 
what [Mr. Normandeau did] exactly, because I was out talking to the lady [Ms. Marion] at this 
time"). 
20
 Dep. of Kristen Marion, the cited portions of which are attached as exhibit 5, at 
47:12-13. 
21
 Mat99:16-101:l. 
22
 Id at 42:24-43:6; 101:5-8. 
23
 See id at 101:13-102:16. 
24
 M a t 103:1-2. 
25
 See response to f^ 5.c, supra. 
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"21. Instead of checking for any torque build up, Normandeau started to remove the 
four bolts from the yoke that connects the driveline to the rear differential." 
Response: The plaintiffs do not dispute that Mr. Normandeau started to remove the 
bolts from the yoke that connected the driveline to the rear differential. It is unknown whether 
Mr. Normandeau checked for any torque build up first.26 
"27. When Mr. Jacobson was asked his opinion regarding why this accident happened, 
he testified 'obviously there was pressure on the driveline, so I guess that wasn't checked....'" 
Response: Mr. Jacobson's testimony was inadmissible. It was speculative and lacked 
foundation. Mr. Jacobson did not see the accident happen and did not talk with anyone involved 
in the accident, other thain a brief conversation with the investigator, who "didn't really say a lot" 
but "just said that it was okay to take the truck to the shop and that."27 Counsel for the plaintiffs 
and for International objected to the testimony on the grounds of speculation and lack of 
foundation.28 Mr. Jacobson's complete answer was: "I think~I mean, obviously there was 
pressure on the driveline, so I guess that wasn't checked. It is hard to say. I mean, you would 
26
 See response to ^f 5.c & 20, supra. 
27
 See Dep. of Landon Jacobson, the cited portions of which are attached as exhibit 
6, at 12:20-13:19. 
28
 See id at 48:6-11. 
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think that it was the pressure of the driveline that had killed him, but first--1 don't know, the 
driveline."29 
"28. When asked if he had ever read that built-up tension in a driveline can kill you, 
Mr. Jacobson replied, 'It is just kind of-for mechanics, mechanic everyday kind of knowledge, I 
guess.'" 
Response: Mr. Jacobson so testified. However, he also testified that he had never read 
that built-up tension in a driveline can be fatal and that the reason he was told to check for 
driveline tension is because it is hard to undo the driveline if it is under pressure.30 He had never 
heard of anyone being seriously hurt or killed from failure to check driveline tension.31 In fact, 
he had never seen anything like this accident before.32 
"29. Normandeau's supervisor Mr. Bundy believes Normandeau made a mistake by 
not first trying to release and unload the pressure that was built-up in the driveline before he 
attempted to disassemble it." 
Id at 48:13-18 (emphasis added). 
See id at 51:1-5 & 51:15-52:5. 
Id at 24:11-14; 52:6-9. 
Id at 23:25-24:2. 
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29 
30 
31 
32 
Response: Mr. Bundy's testimony was inadmissible. Plaintiffs' counsel objected to 
the question to which Mr. Bundy was responding as calling for speculation and a conclusion.33 
Mr. Bundy also lacked foundation for his opinion. Mr. Bundy was not present at the time of the 
accident and did not know what attempts, if any, Mr. Normandeau had made to try to release 
pressure in the driveline.34 When asked if Mr. Normandeau did anything wrong, Larry Freeman, 
the most experienced tow-truck driver deposed, testified: "He done nothing that I wouldn't have 
done or probably any other wrecker operator would have done. As far as I am concerned, he 
done everything right. . . . fl[] I mean, that is my opinion, he done it right.'65 When asked if the 
procedure Mr. Normandeau followed was normal, Mr. Freeman testified: "Yeah, very normal. I 
wouldn't have done it any different."36 
"30. When Mr. Bundy was asked, '[W]ho, other than Mr. Normandeau would be 
responsible for his accident?' He answered, 'Nobody I know."' 
33 
34 
35 
36 
See Bundy dep., ex. 1, at 27:14-23. 
See id. at 17:8-12; response to ffl[ 5.c & 20, supra 
See Freeman dep., ex. 2, at 67:17-68:1. 
See id. at 68:7-15. See also id. at 69:5-6 ("He had done everything fine"). 
11 
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Response: Mr. Bundy's testimony was inadmissible. Counsel for the plaintiffs and 
for International objected to this question on the grounds that it called for "rank speculation" and 
for an expert opinion.37 Mr. Bundy also lacked foundation for his opinion.38 
"31. In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege only one theory of liability against 
defendant Hanson Equipment for the negligent repair of the truck, which caused it 'to break 
down under circumstances that required it to be towed.'" 
Response: The plaintiffs' amended complaint states three claims against all 
defendants-strict products liaibility, negligence and breach of warranty.39 
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS 
The following additional facts are relevant to this motion: 
1. Kristen Marion, a reservist called up to active duty after September 11, had to 
move her family from Gypsum, Colorado, to Washington state, where she was stationed. She 
arranged to rent a Ryder truck for the move.40 
Bundy dep., ex. 1, at 55:15-56:9. 
See response to f^ 29, supra. 
See Am. Compl. & Jury Demand at 9-12. 
See Marion dep., ex. 5, at 5:1-3; 8:4-25.; 125:22-25. 
12 
37 
38 
39 
40 
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1 related to and focused on the possible negligence of my client, 
2 to let it lie, because they didn't take care of their burden to 
3 I establish testimony about him, and they still haven't, through 
4 any proper expert testimony. I've got the only towing expert 
5 in this case. 
6 I Once she did — and I still think that's my posi --
7 that's going to be my position at trial Judge, is that they 
8 don't have any basis for putting him on the verdict form, 
9 for faulting him. They're trying to grab a hold of some 
10 depo transcript statements that are out of context, without 
11 foundation, without an expertise established. They're just 
12 not going to make it. 
13 Now, if they do, I suppose that's a possibility, but I 
14 don't think they could. Therefore — and that's why I didn't 
15 designate them, your Honor, and I — and the rules didn't 
16 require me to — the scheduling order; but now with her motion, 
17 and where she's now alleging, MOh, he was negligent, and he's 
18 the sole proximate cause," I thought it was incumbent on me, at 
19 this point, even though she still hadn't designated an expert, 
20 puts me in kind of rock and a hard place. I thought, I've got 
21 to pull this defensive expert out now and use him. 
22 THE COURT: Okay, and let's talk about the last one. 
23 MS. MORGAN: Okay, your Honor. Okay, I want to just 
24 reiterate a few of the facts, just so it's a little clearer in 
25 our mind about how all this whole thing happened. 
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1 On November 10th is when this — of 2001 is when the 
2 accident happened. Two days before that, Hansen Equipment was 
3 asked to repair the hydraulic line that controls the brakes and 
4 power steering. We are suing, for purposes of this motion 
5 only, that this repair was done improperly. What we're saying 
6 is, even if it was done improperly, it was just not foreseeable 
7 that this particular accident would have arisen out of this — 
8 out of that improper repair. 
9 The repair was done. Ms. Marion goes to rent the 
10 truck. She's on her way to Washington. She's been called up. 
11 She needs to head to Bremerton. She loads up her Ryder truck 
12 and she heads through Spanish Fork Canyon. As she gets atop 
13 the canyon, she realizes she's losing power; and the truck's 
14 failsafe mechanism begins to slow the vehicle and to pull it 
15 over. 
16 I She was able to pull it over off the side of the 
17 road, you know, out of traffic, without a problem. She calls 
18 — she's highly agitated, because she needs to be getting to 
19 Washington. So she calls and asks for assistance. They bring 
20 this first tow truck driver, who comes. He takes a look at the 
21 hose. Says, "Gosh, looks like we've got a bad hose here. Let 
22 me see if I can find it." 
23 Unfortunately, it was a Friday before a long weekend 
24 — or before a weekend, I guess, and he was not able to find a 
2 5 replacement hose. So he lets the folks at roadside assistance 
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1 know that, and say, "Hey, you guys have got to send a bigger 
2 wrecker, because mine's just too small for this." 
3 So they send Kenworth, who sends Mr. Normandeau. 
4 Mr. Normandeau gets to the scene. He says, "What happened?" 
5 I Mr. Freeman says, "Looks like the hose went out on this — the 
6 hydraulic line for the power steering and brakes. Do you want 
7 to see it?" and the guy — he says, "No, I don't need to see 
8 it. Let's just get down to towing the vehicle." 
9 Then — and the one thing I wanted to point out to 
10 your Honor, which I think is a good visual, because as I read 
11 the moving papers again to prepare, it's not very clear. On 
12 Exhibit F, the very last photograph on Exhibit F shows the 
13 drive line, and it's a very good picture which will help 
14 demonstrate where it is. 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 MS. MORGAN: We've got the drive line, and then the 
17 two axles. There's the front and rear axle. The rear axle is 
18 where Mr. Normandeau is attempting to do the tow; and you can 
19 see on that photograph the four bolts that he has to remove 
20 from that drive line in order to remove it. You can kind of 
21 appreciate a little bit from that photograph the — that he 
22 was on his haunches, having to get under there and do it. 
23 Does your have — it should be a color photograph, the 
24 last page of Exhibit F? 
25 THE COURT: I have only black and white on my copy. 
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1 MS. MORGAN: Oh, gosh. Well, I'm — may I approach, 
2 your Honor? 
3 THE COURT: Sure. 
4 J MS. MORGAN: This is my copy. Did you get a copy? 
5 MR. KING: I got a black and white also. 
6 MS. MORGAN: You got a black and white also? 
7 MR. KING: Yeah. 
8 I MS. MORGAN: I apologize, I had no idea. Here you go, 
9 your Honoi, you can use that one instead. You can appreciate 
10 from there where this is, is underneath the carriage, and it's 
11 toward the back where he has to remove those four bolts that 
12 connect the drive line to that rear axle. I mean, that's over-
13 simplified but that's basically the deal. 
14 He had undone two of the bolts, and as he reached over 
15 — he reached his head over that — he was on his haunches and 
16 reached over the drive line to get that third and fourth bolt; 
17 and that's when the drive line smacked up and hit him m the 
18 head, and hit his head into the undercarriage of the truck. 
19 That's what killed him, was that head to the head. 
20 So after he'd undone the bolts, he hits his head. The 
21 tow truck driver says, "Gosh, did you cold cock yourself, kid," 
22 you know, not knowing what happened. He catches the man's 
23 head, and realizes that he's dead. Then, Mr. Jacobson is 
24 called again from Kenworth to come and tow the truck; and he 
25 doesn't know anything about a hose. All he knows is he's got a 
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1 — and the drive line is already disconnected, and he goes 
2 ahead and continues the tow without incident. 
3 The important thing that I think is critical for the 
4 Court's determination on this issue is there's two main — two 
5 facts that the plaintiffs have stipulated to. First, in their 
6 amended complaint in paragraph 37, it says that "Normandeau 
7 had to disconnect the drive line, so as to not damage the 
8 transmission." 
9 Their expert Rudy Limpert says the same thing in 
10 his affidavit at paragraph 10. This is important, because 
11 Mr. Normandeau, to protect the transmission, had to do this 
12 job. As a tow truck driver, it was incumbent on him to know 
13 how to properly do that. 
14 The other paragraph that was admitted is our paragraph 
15 No. 8 of the memorandum and opposition, which says that if the 
16 drive line doesn't wiggle — in other words, when he's down 
17 there and he was checking his drive line to see if there's 
18 any tension built up, if it doesn't wiggle, there's no way to 
19 know how much tension is built up, whether it's 100 pounds of 
20 pressure, or 1,000 pounds of pressure. There's no way to know. 
21 It was incumbent on Mr. Normandeau to check that pressure build 
22 up before he tried to disengage the drive line. 
23 THE COURT: Would you get Counsel a glass of water, 
24 please? 
25 MS. MORGAN: Oh, you know, I've got one. I'm sorry. 
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1 I'm just so use to coughing all week, I'm just used to it. 
2 Thank you. I have one, ma'am. 
3 COURT CLERK: Oh, do you? 
4 MS. MORGAN: Uh-huh. 
5 COURT CLERK: Okay, well, I'll give you another one. 
6 MS. MORGAN: Okay, thank you. So I think those two 
7 things are critical to know in this particulair case, is that's 
8 what the tow truck driver needs to do when he gets there, is 
9 he's got to disengage the drive line so he can tow the thing 
10 away. 
11 As you know, in a negligence case, they have to prove 
12 duty, breach, causation and damages. In this case, they can't 
13 prove duty, and they can't prove causation. With respect 
14 to the duty, we — there needs to be an analysis of the 
15 relationship between the parties, to find out whether one 
16 party owes a duty to another. As we talked about in our 
17 moving papers, there's no special relationship here. There's 
18 no contractual relationship, fiduciary relationship, filial 
19 relationship, anything like that. 
20 So then we have to look at other factors to determine 
21 whether there's a duty owed. We've pointed the Court to this 
22 Amesol Industries case for the factors that Courts consider in 
23 determining whether or not there is a duty owed. In response 
24 to our citation, the only one that plaintiff's contest is the 
25 foreseeability issue. There really aren't any other factors to 
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1 consider in this case as to whether a duty was owed, except for 
2 the foreseeability. 
3 In this case, it would have been foreseeable to Hansen 
4 Equipment when they — and if they do a negligent repair, that 
5 the hose -- what they did to this power steering mechanism, 
6 would cause it to fail. So it's clear that if they put a bad 
7 hose on, or put one that was insufficient pressure or whatever, 
8 it's going to fail; and that the vehicle would end up going 
9 into self-preservation and pulling over to the side of the road 
10 for the safety of its occupants. 
11 What would have been foreseeable is if something had 
12 happened to the occupants of that vehicle. If they had been --
13 instead of being atop Soldier's Summit, if they had been on the 
14 decline, and they didn't have control over the vehicle, and it 
15 had run into another motorist, or if they — if the driver had 
16 tried to overcorrect, and crashed, if they had hit a parked 
17 vehicle on the side of the road when the deal pulled over, 
18 those are all foreseeable; but it is just too out of the realm 
19 to think that a tow truck driver coming to the scene is not 
20 going to be able to tow the vehicle. 
21 Just because someone does a negligent repair that 
22 causes a vehicle to pull over, doesn't translate into any tow 
23 truck driver that comes along and doesn't do the tow right, is 
24 going to be a foreseeable plaintiff. It's just too remote in 
25 this case. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
going 
would 
it' s a 
possib 
tO tOVv 
shaft. 
needs 
matter 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
COURT: 
MORGAN: 
COURT: 
to have to be 
MS. MORGAN 
be towed, but 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
COURT: 
MORGAN 
COURT: 
Wait a minute now. 
Yes. 
— it's foreseeable 
towed. 
-35-
If the hose fails — 
that the ve 
No, it's — it's not necessari 
that the hose would 
Okay. 
So it would — it -
need to be 
— 
ihicle's 
.ly that it 
repaired. 
If you're out on the road someplace, and 
weekend or Friday night, and the 
ilit y 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
r this 
MS. 
to be 
THE 
MS. 
that the vehicle's going to 
MORGAN 
COURT: 
MORGAN 
COURT: 
vehicle, 
MORGAN 
done. 
COURT: 
MORGAN 
Yeah, let's say — 
That's foreseeable. 
hose fails, 
have to be 
That is foreseeable. 
Okay, and it's also 
that you've got to 
it's a good 
towed. 
foreseeable in order 
disconnect the drive 
: Of any time you tow this vehicle, that 
All right. 
: But there's a relationship — 
to the tow truck driver what the 
with the --
is he' s got 
the hose or 
it didn't 
heck the problem was 
the reason why it broke down. A]1 the guy knows 
to tow the truck. Doesn't matter whether it was 
a flat tire or whatever. He just know he's got to 
-36-
1 come and tow the truck. So there's a big disconnect between 
2 what Hansen could have foreseen with that repair and with the 
3 tow truck driver. 
4 THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that it's foreseeable 
5 that if the hose fails, the truck's going to have to be towed; 
6 and it follows the night to day, if the truck's going to be 
7 towed, you've got to disconnect the drive shaft, right? 
8 MS. MORGAN: Okay, yes. 
9 THE COURT: And it's also, it seems to me, foreseeable 
10 that in disconnecting this drive shaft, because of the way it's 
11 designed, apparently, that there could be substantial torque on 
12 it. 
13 MS. MORGAN: With any vehicle that one tows, they are 
14 taught to check for the drive — to wiggle the drive line, or 
15 to check the drive line to see if there's torque built up in 
16 it. That's with any vehicle that gets towed. So this is no 
17 different than any other situation that he would have come 
18 across. 
19 THE COURT: And you test for that because the torque is 
20 a danger? 
21 MS. MORGAN: Yes, that's right. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. So that's foreseeable; the danger's 
23 foreseeable. 
24 MS. MORGAN: Well, I — 
25 THE COURT: That's why we test the — that's why we 
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1 I wiggle it. 
2 MS. MORGAN: It's foreseeable to a tow truck driver 
3 when they come up -- from the tow truck driver's perspective, 
4 it's foreseeable that they need — that there may be built-up 
5 tension in the drive line that they need to check and make sure 
6 that that's been relieved before they tow the truck. Doesn't 
7 matter — any truck that would — like this Ryder truck that 
8 gets pushed over to the side of the road, or is incapacitated 
9 for whatever reason, the tow truck driver knows that he needs 
10 to check that drive line. 
11 What's not foreseeable is that a repairman on the 
12 front end repairing the vehicle, is going to think that the 
13 tow truck driver isn't going to do his job correctly, and 
14 isn't going to check for the built-up torque. I mean, we gave 
15 this — an analogy in the briefing. It's like someone's air 
16 conditioning unit going out; and they call a handyman. He 
17 can't fix it; so they call the professionals to remove the air 
18 conditioning unit off a roof. The guy that removes the air 
19 conditioning unit falls off the roof and is injured. Well, 
20 it's not the responsibility of whoever made the faulty repair 
21 in the first place. It was up to him to take precautions to 
22 not fall of the roof. 
23 There was a case that we've cited, too, this Banzazine 
24 case. It's a motor vehicle case where two people are starting 
25 to get agitated with each other as they're driving along the 
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1 motor way; and one's getting behind the other and flashing 
2 their brights, and then the other one's speeding up and get 
3 in front of the other. 
4 Well, the agitated — one of the agitated drivers 
5 pulls out a gun and shoots one of the occupants in the vehicle. 
6 The Court found it's just too remote and unforeseeable that 
7 someone would engage in road rage to the extent of pulling out 
8 a gun and shooting someone. 
9 It's foreseeable they might have been in a car 
10 accident, they might have hit somebody else, each other, run 
11 off the road; but that's just too remote of a possibility that 
12 someone might pull out a vehicle and — or pull out a gun and 
13 shoot somebody. 
14 I mean, it's kind of the same thing here. If, you 
15 know, some strange person came out of the woods and shot 
16 Mr. Normandeau, I mean, that's unforeseeable that something 
17 like that would happen. 
18 THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that in this case, 
19 when that hose fails, we end up with a lock on the drive shaft; 
20 and that can potentially be a very dangerous situation, and 
21 it's caused — that is caused by the failure of the hose. 
22 The guy goes in. He tries to fix it, and he may be negligent, 
23 maybe he isn't, I don't known, but anyway, he's killed by that 
24 dangerous condition that exists because of the failure of the 
25 hose. 
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1 MS. MORGAN: But — 
2 THE COURT: That's different from bringing in a totally 
3 unconnected element like a person acting, as you've said. 
4 The failure of the air conditioning unit doesn't create the 
5 dangerous condition on the roof. Roofs are dangerous anyway. 
6 MS. MORGAN: Right, and just — and the same would be 
7 said for a Ryder truck like this. 
8 THE COURT: But I don't agree with that. It seems to 
9 me that the dangerous condition is created by the failure of 
10 the hose, which then clamps down on this, which forces the 
11 equipment to clamp down on the drive shaft. 
12 MS. MORGAN: No, the — all the hose did was force the 
13 vehicle off to the side of the road. Let me raise something 
14 that might help. 
15 THE COURT: Well, I may not understand how it works, 
16 but my understanding is that when the hose fails, and the 
17 hydraulic fluid escapes — 
18 MS. MORGAN: Drained. 
19 THE COURT: — that the equipment then clamps onto the 
20 drive shaft. The drive shaft may or may not have at that point 
21 a tension on it; is that right? 
22 MS. MORGAN: Yes, but the tortional energy is there. 
23 There are many possibilities for why there might be this build 
24 up. That's why it doesn't really matter what the repair was, 
25 because any time a tow truck driver comes to the scene, he has 
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1 to check for this tortional built-up energy. 
2 With respect to Rudy Limpert's affidavit that was 
3 provided in support of defendant's motion — or our opposition, 
4 it says that in this model, both the power steering and power 
5 brakes are supplied from a single hydraulic pump. The parking 
6 brake system also uses hydraulic pressure from the same pump. 
7 All three systems — that is, the brake boost, power 
8 steering, and parking brake release, utilize the same hydraulic 
9 fluid pump and reservoir. A leak in any one of those system 
10 components will render the vehicle without service brake, power 
11 steering, and parking brake release. 
12 There are many reasons that could have caused the 
13 vehicle to pull over; and when Mr. Normandeau came to the 
14 scene, he says, "What happened?" and the guy says, "Well, looks 
15 like we got a bad hose here to the hydraulic line feeding the 
16 power steering and the brake. Do you want to see the hose?" 
17 He's like, "No, I don't need to see it." 
18 It's not even computing in — for him that that's 
19 something he needs to consider. He just knows always when he 
20 comes to the scene, he needs to check for any drive line build 
21 — any tork buildup in the drive line. So whether this hose is 
22 what caused it to pull over or not, really doesn't matter to 
23 Mr. Normandeau; and in this particular case didn't matter to 
24 Normandeau. 
25 Another thing I wanted to touch on is that this 
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1 foreseeability, it seems to apply not only to duty, but with 
2 respect to causation. So let me move onto that as well. 
3 Looking at the Banzazine case and Stephensen and the Reese 
4 case that were cited, what is for — what needs to be foreseen 
5 is he general nature of the injury in order to hold Hansen 
6 Equipment liable. 
7 1 In this case, the general nature of the injury was a 
8 hit in the head to Mr. Normandeau. So we have to ask ourselves, 
9 was it foreseeable to Hansen that Mr. Normandeau would hit 
10 himself in the head by this built-up drive line — or torque 
11 in the drive line. 
12 In this case, your Honor, it cannot be said that that 
13 -- that kind of injury, that the general nature of that injury 
14 was foreseeable. Again, what would have been foreseeable is if 
15 an injury to"the occupants of the vehicle or other motorists on 
16 the roadway. I'm just going to just grab some water really 
17 quickly. 
18 MR. KING: I'll get it for you. 
19 MS. MORGAN: I'm going to IHC as soon as I'm done here. 
20 THE COURT: So you're talking about injuries of the 
21 people in the vehicle? 
22 MS. MORGAN: Yes, that is what would have been 
23 foreseeable. That would have been of a general nature that 
24 one would have expected to have happened, is something might 
2 5 have happened to somebody on the roadway, because of this hose 
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1 leaking and being pulled over to the side of the road. 
2 I wanted to point out with respect to the affidavits, 
3 we already talked about — we touched on Dr. Limpert's, but I 
4 also wanted to point out that he's their brake expert; and he 
5 says in paragraph 8, "This defective repair was the reason for 
6 the subject truck breaking down and requiring towing services." 
7 He doesn't say that there's any connection with the hose and 
8 with the drive line being connected. All he can recognize is 
9 that when the repair was done incorrectly, that's what caused 
10 it to have to be pulled over. 
11 Same with Mr. Andrews. He says at paragraph 5, "An 
12 experienced service shot for International Trucks, like Hansen 
13 Equipment, should know that if it didn't properly repair or 
14 replace the hydraulic hose, the truck would likely break down 
15 I and have to be towed. 
16 So what is foreseeable is that the truck would have 
17 to be towed. There might be a towing bill. It might even be 
18 someone has to stay in a hotel to accommodate this darn thing 
19 having to be fixed and repaired; but what's not foreseeable is 
20 that the tow truck driver would come to the scene and not do 
21 his job. He didn't check and wiggle the drive line like he 
22 should have. 
23 Because of that, your Honor, in plaintiff's amended 
24 complaint, paragraph 59, their only claim against Hansen 
25 Equipment is that the negligent repair caused it to break down 
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1 under circumstances which required it to be towed. That was 
2 all. What would be foreseeable would be things that might be 
3 related to the cost of a towing, but not to someone dying, 
4 doing an improper tow. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Mr. King, tell me why you think 
6 — or what facts there are here in this case that would support 
7 a nexus between the loss of hydraulic fluid and the dangerous 
8 torque situation existing. 
9 MR. KING: Yes, sir, and that's an important thing, 
10 because contrary to what Melinda's trying to fit this into, 
11 the facts are — and they're established through the affidavits 
12 of Mr. — of Dr. Rudy Limpert and Mr. Ron Andrews, and those 
13 affidavits are uncontradicted, by the way — in which they say 
14 that — and it's also supported by the testimony of Mr. Mink in 
15 his deposition from I-Tech. 
16 The hose, as Dr. Limpert points out, is a return hose 
17 line from the drive line brake system up to the power steering 
18 pump, and it failed. When there's a loss of pressure, hydraulic 
19 pressure In the hose to the power to the drive line pump, it 
20 automatically activates, by virtue of a very strong spring 
21 in that, and the spring is held out by the hydraulic hose 
22 pressure. The hose — 
2 3 THE COURT: And then where does the pres — where does 
24 the spring activate; on the brake drums? 
2 5 MR. KING: No, no, it activates right on the drive 
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1 line. Do you — 
2 THE COURT: So on the drive shaft itself? 
3 MR. KING: The drive shaft itself. That's right. 
4 THE COURT: So a failure in the hose, puts pressure on 
5 the drive line? 
6 MR. KING: Yeah, the failure in the hose actually 
7 causes — while the vehicle's still moving, the power steering 
8 access or assist is lost. So it causes the driver to not to be 
9 able to control the vehicle as well; and it causes the brakes 
10 — the drive line parking brake — there's not the service 
11 brakes, the parking brake — to clamp down on the moving 
12 turning drive line. That stays there, and there's no way to 
13 release that, as long as there's no hydraulic pressure. So 
14 that stays there, clamps down, and as that vehicle slows down, 
15 that's where the tortional energy is imparted to the drive 
16 line. 
17 Contrary to suppose — suppose — and that's where 
18 the built-up tension arises. This is also uncontradicted, 
19 Dr. Rupert, Rudy Rupert said it's unseen. Mr. Freeman said 
20 he didn't see anything. So you can't tell just by being there 
21 that this has 8,000 pounds of tortional energy. 
22 There's an issue of fact there as to how much it 
23 had. No one knows. A lot of times there's some minor amount 
24 of tortional energy in these drive lines, and people like 
25 Mr. Normandeau go ahead and sometimes they push it back and 
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1 forth or do something to release any energy in there, sometimes 
2 they don't. 
3 Mr. Freeman said -- even though he usually didn't tow 
4 vehicles this big, that he had done vehicles this big about 20 
5 or 30 times; and he had no idea that that kind of energy could 
6 be imparted or in a drive line. 
7 THE COURT: So if I understand your theory, then, it's 
8 foreseeable that the hose could fail? 
9 MR. KING: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: And it's foreseeable that if the hose 
11 fails, that the vehicle will have to be towed. If it's going 
12 to have to be towed, you have to disconnect the drive shaft, 
13 which has now become a dangerous instrument because of the 
14 torque? 
15 MR. KING: Yes, which danger, the extent and nature 
16 specifically of the danger may or may not be appreciated by the 
17 tow truck driver. 
18 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
19 MR. KING: That distinguishes this case, your Honor, 
20 from something like this. Suppose Hansen's repair had not 
21 been to that piece of equipment, to that hydraulic hose, but to 
22 the service brakes that were, let's suppose, un — totally 
23 unconnected or separate hydraulic system from the parking brake 
24 and the power steering. It has a light that says your brakes 
25 are down; and she pulls over. 
-46-
1 There would not have been, in that instance, any 
2 tortional energy, or at least that amount of tortional energy 
3 caused by the drive line parking, by clamping down on the drive 
4 line. Whatever energy there would have been that stopped it, 
5 may have been negligible, it may not have been there at all; 
6 but it certainly wouldn't have killed him. 
7 If there had been a fuel line, a fuel pump failure and 
8 the vehicle stopped, Mr. Normandeau still comes out and still 
9 unhooks the drive line, if he's going to tow it, if he can't 
10 fix it out there. Still got to unhook the drive line, no 
11 question about it; but there isn't that causal — that causal 
12 nexus to what the defendant's done at that point. There 
13 wouldn't have been that. So this is a different situation. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. KING: One other thing. They had — she has stated 
16 a couple of times that it's maybe foreseeable that — she's 
17 admitted that in her brief at page 4, in a reply brief at 
18 page 6 to 8, that there's a duty that she admits that her 
19 client would have had if this had been Kristen Marion — or — 
20 yeah, Kristen — is that her name? 
21 MS. MORGAN: Yes. 
22 MR. KING: I think I said it backwards before, didn't 
23 I? Kristen Marion, the driver, or her passengers, or another 
24 motorist coming by; or as she said here in Court today, if 
25 she'd plowed into somebody, that those people all would have 
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1 had actions back, duty-wise, and their client -- her client 
2 would have had a duty to those people. 
3 I How she can say that, but deny that a serviceman who 
4 comes out, who's presence is mandated, mandated, by the very 
5 failure of the negligent repair, of the product that they 
6 negligently repaired, there's no other way to get that vehicle 
7 out of there except a tow truck driver. He's the one person 
8 who is going to be there. 
9 THE COURT: Well, let me give you this hypothetical. 
10 Suppose everything happened the way it happened, and the tow 
11 truck driver comes up to tow the place, and he arrives at the 
12 scene, and the back door of the tow truck pops open and hits 
13 him in the head and kills him. There would be no nexus. 
14 MR. KING: I think that would be a much tougher case 
15 for me. 
16 THE COURT: Yeah, there's no nexus there. 
17 MR. KING: Yeah, I think that's more like your — I 
18 think that's more like her example of the — of the roof, the 
19 guy on the roof — 
20 THE COURT: Yeah. 
21 MR. KING: — with the air condition. Yeah, I agree. 
22 THE COURT: That's what I — that's what it seems to me 
23 but — 
24 MR. KING: Yeah. 
2 5 THE COURT: Okay, anything else that you want to add? 
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1 MR. KING: One other thing, is that she said it's not 
2 foreseeable to Hansen that the tower wouldn't do his job 
3 correctly; but that's just not the law in this state. When 
4 you're talking about proximate cause, when you're talking about 
5 foreseeablity as a matter of — as a subsection of duty. 
6 Duty is decided by the Court, as a matter of law. 
7 I don't think there's an issue here that the jury needs to 
8 decide. This is — ought to be decided by the Judge, by the 
9 Court, whether or not there's a duty. Then the factual issues 
10 of was this a proximate cause; was there an intervening cause; 
11 was Mr. Nonandos conduct an intervening cause? Is that even an 
12 appropriate instruction anymore, under these facts, under the 
13 Liability Reform Act of 1986? Those are issues that we can 
14 deal with later, but if there are any issues, those are factual 
15 issues for the jury. 
16 Utah law is clear under Cruz vs. Middlecoff, and 
17 it tracks other states, that the duty of an actor is not 
18 removed simply because of conduct of a later actor that may 
19 be negligent, even reckless, even criminal. It's a matter of 
20 foreseeability; and the application of those principles of, is 
21 this an appropriate extension of the actor's duty. 
22 This is clearly an appropriate extension of it. 
23 This is an entity that was certified and approved by I-Tech, 
24 International Truck, to work on its own trucks, this very kind 
25 of truck; and they knew and are presumed to know the effects of 
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1 their negligent repair. So they knew this truck better than my 
2 I tow truck driver did. 
3 I The fact that my tow truck driver — let's assume he 
4 was negligent, or even worse, that doesn't remove the duty. 
5 I That would be an issue, then, under the comparative fault of 
6 how much is he at fault and how much is neg — Hansen at fault. 
7 I One — the Cruz case, by the way, was a case in which 
8 Middlecoff, Mercury or Ford or whoever they were, a dealer was 
9 held respond — liable — subject to liability in a trial, and 
10 a summary judgment was overruled, where they left the keys in 
11 the car out in the parking — out on the lot, the keys of their 
12 cars. It was fenced and whatever, but they left the keys in 
13 there, and it had been burgled before, and they'd had people 
14 run off with their cars. 
15 Well, they still did it, and somebody stole a car, 
16 drove off and hit or killed someone. Then that someone sued 
17 Middlecoff, and that proceeded to trial, because that duty 
18 extended to people, even though the intermediary then was 
19 committing criminal conduct. 
20 Another good example of this is in our case, the 
21 Bybee case -- I think that's case we quoted out of California 
22 — vs. Pacific Tel, where — this is one of those cases that 
23 give lawyers — plaintiff lawyers a bad name, but in terms of 
24 the duty, it was found by the California Appellate Courts that 
25 Pacific Tel's stationing of a phone booth right by a busy 
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1 highway would subject them to liability with a door that was 
2 difficult to get out of if somebody was in that, and somebody 
3 ran off the road, and in that case they were drunk and hit this 
4 person in the phone booth. 
5 Well, I mean you could argue that's ridiculous. This 
6 negligent, reckless or criminal conduct to run off the road; 
7 but in that case the circumstances allowed and required that 
8 to go to a jury, because the Court correctly found that there's 
9 a duty of the actor, the first actor. If there's certain 
10 things that are foreseeable, because of the nexus of the facts 
11 and the closeness in causation, that that duty is appropriate 
12 to extend to those kinds of actors. Thank you. 
13 THE COURT: I'll give you the last word, Ms. Morgan. 
14 MS. MORGAN: Thank you, your Honor. I'll be brief. 
15 What's important to remember is that the standard and the law 
16 in Utah is that the general nature of this injury is what 
17 needed to be foreseeable. This injury in this case was a hit 
18 in the head from a drive — from built-up tension in the drive 
19 line, which it could not have been foreseeable. Mr. Bundy was 
20 taught how to test for built-up — for tension in a drive line, 
21 and how to relieve it when he found it there. 
22 The thing that plaintiff seemed to dispute, really, is 
23 the amount of tortional stress that was built up in that drive 
24 line, not that there already would have been built-up stress in 
25 the drive line. That's just something that he, as an everyday 
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1 tow truck driver would have known to check for when he went. 
2 It's important to know that he knew what the problem was with 
3 I the vehicle when he got there. He knew that the hose was 
4 missing; and that there was a problem with the hydraulic hose 
5 that controls the brake and power steering. So in this case he 
6 knew the situation that he was getting into. 
7 I THE COURT: Isn't this an argument for contributory 
8 negligence? I mean, I don't see that it goes to cause — to, 
9 you know, foreseeability. 
10 MS. MORGAN: Well, that's a good point. What I'm 
11 trying to illustrate is that he understood that he, regardless 
12 of the situation, and regardless of how much or how little 
13 tension was built up in the drive line, he still needed to 
14 check for the drive line. 
15 So in other words, whether their argument of the hose 
16 would have made it more stressful or not, I'm just saying in 
17 this situation, he knew that there would have been tortional 
18 stress anyway, whether or not the hose was there. 
19 Also, with respect to the Cruz case, when someone 
20 steels a car and then ends up hitting someone on the roadway, 
21 that is foreseeable. What wouldn't be foreseeable is the tow 
22 truck driver that came to tow the disabled truck wouldn't have 
23 done the tow correctly, wouldn't have checked the drive line to 
24 make sure that there was built-up stress. So thank you, your 
25 Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Well, I think Counsel 
2 have done a very good job in briefing and arguing. So the 
3 ideal would be just not to able to — just no decision in this 
4 thing, and just congratulate you and let you go; but I have to 
5 decide. 
6 MR. KING: It would be nice if all lawsuits could be 
7 handled that way. Then nobody would ever feel bad. 
8 THE COURT: You've all done a great job. I hope you're 
9 all paid by the hour, and we'll see — we'll see you later. 
10 So first of all, with respect to apportioning the fault, what 
11 I'm going to do is, I'm going to give Ms. Morgan an opportunity 
12 to apportion the fault; but because I'm going to do that, there 
13 may be some additional expert or other discovery with respect 
14 to the employer only, not with respect to Mr. Freeman's 
15 involvement. 
16 I'm going to permit the expert witness that plaintiff 
17 wants to have, Jesse Enriquez, but again, I'm going to give 
18 you opportunity to challenge his credibility through his 
19 qualifications and so forth. That may require some additional 
20 discovery, deposition or whatever they want to do. I'll give 
21 them that opportunity to do that as well. 
22 On the motion for summary judgment — 
23 MR. KING: Your Honor? 
24 THE COURT: Yeah? 
25 MR. KING: I'm sorry to interrupt you. 
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1 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
2 J MR. KING: May I ask for one clarification on that? 
3 THE COURT: Yeah. 
4 MR. KING: We designated Mr. Enrique as an expert 
5 solely as someone who might be named to defend the conduct of 
6 Dennis Normandeau. We didn't know and didn't anticipate him 
7 having — him being the person who might have to defend the 
8 employer as far as training of people in a diesel mechanic 
9 shop or tewing. He might be able to do that. I'm just asking 
10 for leave of — 
11 THE COURT: Well, if he's the one, then you can present 
12 whatever you're going to present in terms of a report, but 
13 they're going to have full opportunity to cross -- you know, to 
14 take his deposition and examine his qualifications. 
15 MR. KING: I guess what I'm asking for is, if now in 
16 looking at this, knowing that she is going to be blaming the 
17 employer for training, if Mr. Enrique is not the appropriate 
18 person for that, do we have leave to designate someone else? 
19 THE COURT: I'll let you — I'll let you designate. 
20 I'm going to give you some deadlines here in a minute. 
21 MR. KING: Whoever, okay. 
22 THE COURT: I'll let you designate somebody else. 
23 MR. KING: Thank you. 
24 THE COURT: The motion for summary judgment, I think I 
25 understand the defendant's argument. I just feel that based on 
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1 my understanding of the mechanics here — and I don't, I'm 
2 not saying that I'm infallible on that, but based on my 
3 understanding of mechanics, it just seems to me that the 
4 failure of the hose exposes the tow truck driver who's got 
5 to disconnect, if he's going to tow, the drive shaft, to a 
6 hazardous situation. That hazardous situation, it seems, is 
7 even in part caused by the failure of the, you know, directly 
8 caused by the failure of the hydraulics. So I'm going to deny 
9 that — the motion for summary judgment on that. 
10 Now, we're looking at the end of January for trial. 
11 So we've got, what, four months? How quickly can you determine 
12 whether you want to designate Mr. Enriquez or some other expert 
13 on the employer issue? 
14 MR. KING: What's today? 
15 THE COURT: Today is the 12th of September. 
16 MR. KING: Can we have until October 15th? 
17 THE COURT: I think that's a little too long. I think 
18 we ought to cut it short by at least 10 days or so. 
19 MR. KING: Okay. I'm out of — one reason I say that 
20 is I'm out of town from the 24th of this month until this 1st or 
21 2nd. So — 
22 THE COURT: How about the 7th of Ocotber? 
23 MR. KING: That — okay. I'll take that. 
24 THE COURT: I think that's a Friday. 
25 MR. KING: All right. 
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On September 12, 2005, the following motions came on for hearing and were argued 
before the Court: Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment; 
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Notice of Intent to Allocate Fault; and 
Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Jesse A. Enriquez. 
Colin P. King and Paul M. Simmons represented Plaintiffs. Charles H. Thronson 
represented Defendant International Truck and Engine Corporation. Melinda A. Morgan 
represented Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. 
After hearing argument of counsel, and having read the pleadings, exhibits and affidavits 
filed by counsel, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s request to allocate fault to the employer of Dennis 
Normandeau is granted. Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s request to allocate fault to 
Larry Freeman is denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Notice of Intent is 
accordingly denied regarding Dennis Normandeau's employer, and granted 
regarding Larry Freeman. Plaintiffs may designate an expert witness to opine 
concerning the training and supervision provided by Dennis Normandeau's 
employer. 
3. Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Jesse A. Enriquez is 
denied. Plaintiffs may designate Mr. Enriquez as an expert, and defendants are 
allowed to designate their own towing expert. 
4. Plaintiffs may have until October 7, 2005, in which to designate an expert to 
testify regarding the conduct of the employer. 
W<K 
Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. may have until October 21, 2005, in which to 
designate towing and employer experts. 
Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. shall depose the plaintiffs' additional expert 
witness or witnesses by November 7, 2005. 
Plaintiffs shall schedule the deposition(s) of Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s 
expert(s) by November 10, 2005, and shall take these depositions on or before 
November 23, 2005. 
DATED th i sc^Y day of ScptcntfiSr, 2005. 
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5. Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. may have until October 21, 2005, in which to 
designate towing and employer experts. 
6. Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. shall depose the plaintiffs' additional expert 
witness or witnesses by November 7, 2005. 
7. Plaintiffs shall schedule the deposition(s) of Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s 
expert(s) by November 10, 2005, and shall take these depositions on or before 
November 23, 2005. 
DATED this day of September, 2005. 
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36. What Is Negligence? 
A person has the duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other 
people or property. "Negligence" simply means the failure to use 
reasonable care. Reasonable care does not require extraordinary caution 
or exceptional skill. Reasonable care is what an ordinary, prudent, 
person uses in similar situations. 
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the 
situation. You must decide what a prudent person with similar 
knowledge would do in a similar situation. Some situations require 
more caution because a person of ordinary prudence would understand 
that more danger is involved. Less care is expected in situations such as 
when the risk of danger is lower or when the situation happens so 
suddenly that a person of ordinary prudence would not appreciate the 
danger. Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act. 
A person whose injuries or damages are caused by another 
person's negligent conduct may recover compensation from the 
negligent person for those injuries or damages. 
vz&A 
37. Right to Assume Proper Conduct by Others 
A reasonably careful person may assume that other people (1) are 
reasonably intelligent, (2) have normal sight and hearing, and (3) will 
obey the law and be reasonably careful. However, a reasonably careful 
person will not ignore obvious risks created by other persons. 
\/J5=COo 
38. Comparative Negligence 
If you decide that more than one person or entity was responsible 
for Mr. Normandeau's death, you must decide each person's percentage 
of fault. "Fault" means a breach of legal duty and includes negligence. 
This allocation of fault must be done on a percentage basis, and the total 
must be 100%). Each person's percentage should be based on how much 
that person's fault contributed to Mr. Normandeau's death. 
If you allocate a percentage of fault to Mr. Normandeau, the 
Plaintiffs' total recovery will be reduced by that percentage of fault. If 
you decide that Mr. Normandeau's fault was 50% or more, the Plaintiffs 
will recover nothing. 
When you answer the questions about damages on the verdict 
form, do not reduce any damages by Mr. Normandeau's percentage of 
fault, if any. The Court will make that calculation later, based on your 
findings as to the relative percentages of fault and the total damages. 
For example, if you find that Mr. Normandeau's own fault was 20 
percent of all fault proximately causing his death, then the Court will 
reduce the Plaintiffs' recovery by 20 percent of the total damages found 
by the jury. On the other hand, if you find that his fault is 50% or 
greater, then the Plaintiffs shall recover nothing. 
\^^U 
39. Proximate Cause 
A proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury. A proximate cause of an injury is that cause 
which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury and 
without which the injury would not have occurred. Another way to say 
this would be that "but for" the cause, the injury would not have 
occurred. Further, there must not be any extraordinary, unforeseen 
intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation. 
There may be more than one proximate cause of the same harm or 
injury. If the negligence of two or more persons combines to produce an 
injury, and the negligence of each of them is a proximate cause of the 
injury, then the persons must share liability for the resulting injury, in 
proportion their individual fault or negligence. 
40. Product Liability. 
In this case defendant Hanson Equipment claims defendant 
International Truck & Engine Corporation is strictly liable for Dennis 
Normandeau's death because it put a truck into commerce that had a 
defective condition. 
To find that International Truck & Engine Corporation is 
strictly liable, you must find that Hanson Equipment showed by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: 
1. At the time it was sold, the truck had a defective 
condition which made it unreasonably dangerous; and 
2. International Truck & Engine is engaged in the business 
of selling such trucks. 
3. The proven defective condition was a proximate cause 
of Mr. Normandeau's death. 
A product is unreasonably dangerous when it is dangerous to an 
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary and 
prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in the Plaintiffs' 
community, considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, 
dangers, and uses, together with any actual knowledge, training, or 
experience possessed by the Plaintiffs. 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
Hi Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. (Hanson) appeals the jury 
verdict in favor of Plaintiffs Emily Normandeau, individually and 
as guardian for Alex Thayn, Jacob Thayn, and Hannah Normandeau, 
minors; and Lori Normandeau, as guardian for Daniel Normandeau 
and Melissa Normandeau, minors, on behalf of and for the benefit 
of the heirs of Dennis Normandeau (Plaintiffs). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 In early 2001, Dennis Normandeau started working as a 
mechanic for Kemworth Sales Company, a diesel maintenance and 
repair shop and towing service. In May or June 2001, 
Normandeau1s duties were increased to include working as the 
primary wrecking driver. Normandeau's supervisor at Kenworth 
trained Normandeau for his new responsibility and taught him how 
to use a large diesel wrecker. 
%3 On November 10, 2001, Normandeau responded to a call for 
roadside assistance after a Ryder rental truck broke down in 
Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah County, Utah. The truck had a spring-
applied, hydraulically-released parking brake system. The 
parking or emergency brake was on the driveline behind the 
transmission and ran off the power steering unit. The truck 
broke down because it had a leak in the power steering line, 
which caused the parking brake to engage, preventing the 
driveline from turning and causing torque to build up in the 
driveline. 
[^4 To tow the truck, Normandeau had to disconnect the driveline 
from the transmission. As Normandeau was disconnecting the 
driveline, the built-up torque released violently, causing the 
differential yoke to break off. Either the differential yoke or 
the driveshaft hit Normandeau in the head, killing him instantly. 
%5 Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action, alleging that 
Hanson had earlier repaired the truck negligently, which caused 
it to break down. Plaintiffs1 lawsuit also included 
International Truck & Engine Corporation (ITEC), which was the 
designer of the truck's hydraulic system, as well as other 
companies associated with the design, manufacture, and lease of 
the truck. All of the defendants except Hanson were dismissed 
before trial. 
%6 Prior to trial, Hanson filed a motion for summary judgment 
on the grounds that Hanson owed no duty of care to Normandeau, 
that Hanson's repair was not the proximate cause of Normandeau's 
death, and that Normandeau was negligent in preparing the truck 
for towing. The trial court denied Hanson's motion for summary 
judgment, and the case went to trial. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. Hanson then filed a motion for a 
new trial or, in the alternative, for a remittitur. The trial 
court denied that motion, and Hanson now appeals. 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f7 On appeal, Hanson first asserts that the trial court erred 
when it denied Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Because the 
issues presented to the trial court for summary judgment were 
also presented to the jury at trial, we do not consider this 
argument on the merits. 
%B Second, Hanson claims that the trial court erred when it 
failed to instruct the jury regarding ITEC's negligent design of 
the truck's hydraulic system, which caused the parking brake to 
engage and resulted in the presence of torque in the driveline. 
"We review challenges to jury instructions under a correctness 
standard." Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998). 
f9 Third, Hanson asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it failed to strike Normandeau's untimely 
designation of an expert witness who highlighted material issues 
of fact in opposing Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Hanson 
further argues that this error was compounded when the trial 
court granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine to preclude 
Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker from testifying at trial. 
"Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases before 
them . . . ." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen 
Constr., 1999 UT App 87, % 11, 977 P.2d 518. Therefore, we 
review whether a trial court properly ruled on pretrial 
compliance with a scheduling order under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See id. We also review the trial court's grant of 
Plaintiffs' motion in limine under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237, % 12, 74 P.3d 
635. 
KlO Fourth, Hanson argues that Normandeau's counsel made 
improper closing arguments at trial and that these improper 
arguments warrant a new trial. " [T]he grant of a new trial is 
ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court[; 
therefore,] we . . . review the court's decision in this regard 
under an abuse of discretion standard." Child, 972 P.2d at 429. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Summary Judgment 
fll Hanson first argues that the trial court erred when it 
denied Hanson's motion for summary judgment. However, before we 
reach the merits of this argument, we must decide, as a threshold 
matter, whether we should entertain an appeal of the trial 
court's denial of summary judgment after the case was 
subsequently resolved by a trial on the merits. 
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fl2 Generally, "[a] denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
not a final determination on the merits and, therefore, is not an 
appealable interlocutory order." Feiger, Collision & Killmer v. 
Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Colo. 1996); see also Heuser v. 
Schmittroth, 2002 UT App 42U (mem.) (per curiam) ("The denial of 
a summary judgment motion is not final and appealable because it 
leaves the case pending. Upon denial of [a] summary judgment 
motion, [the losing party] ha[s] the burden to either try the 
case or dismiss it.11); Manuel v. Fort Collins Newspapers, Inc., 
631 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Colo. 1981) (noting that in "most . . . 
jurisdictions[, ] the denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
not a final order which may be appealed but is, rather, an 
unappealable interlocutory ruling"). Some jurisdictions, 
including Utah, will allow a denial of a motion for summary 
judgment to be appealed, but only after the final judgment is 
entered in the case. See Manuel, 631 P.2d at 1116; see, e.g., 
Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, 996 P.2d 1043 (reviewing 
the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment). 
However, "[i]n a substantial number of jurisdictions, . . . 
reviewability is denied even after final judgment, particularly 
where the case has gone to trial subsequent to the denial of the 
summary judgment motion." Manuel, 631 P.2d at 1116.x A few 
1. See also Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 476 n.5 (1st Cir. 
1994); Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 570-72 (5th Cir. 
1994); Watson v. Amedco Steel, Inc., 29 F.3d 274, 276-78 (7th 
Cir. 1994); Johnson Intf1 Co. v. Jackson Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 19 
F.3d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1994); Jarrett v. Epperly, 896 F.2d 1013, 
1016 (6th Cir. 1990); Hollev v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft 
Servs., 835 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1988); Locricchio v. 
Legal Servs. Corp.. 833 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1987); 
Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 669 (Fed Cir. 
1986); Feiger, Collision & Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1247 
(Colo. 1996); Phillips v. Abel, 233 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1977) (holding a motion for summary judgment is moot after the 
evidence has been reviewed in a trial on the merits); Evans v. 
Jensen, 655 P.2d 454, 459 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (explaining that 
a final judgment after trial should be tested upon the record 
made at trial not at the time summary judgment was denied); 
Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 174 (Iowa 2004) (holding that 
after a full trial on the merits the denial of summary judgment 
merges with the trial); Skowronski v. Sachs, 818 N.E.2d 635, 638 
n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that no right to review exists 
when case has proceeded to trial on the merits, unless the 
summary judgment issue was on a different claim than was tried); 
Cannon v. Day, 598 S.E.2d 207, 210 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
("Improper denial of a motion for summary judgment is not 
(continued...) 
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jurisdictions provide an exception to this principle and will 
allow appellate review of a denial of summary judgment even after 
a trial on the merits, but only if the motion for summary 
judgment was based on a purely legal question.2 
fl3 Utah case law suggests that we will entertain an appeal of a 
denial of a motion for summary judgment only if it involves a 
legal issue. In Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, 
Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 
(Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a denial of summary 
judgment after a trial on the merits because the trial court "was 
dealing with undisputed facts, [and its] denial of summary 
judgment amounted to a ruling of law." Id. at 326. But in 
Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 144 P.3d 1147, the Utah Supreme 
Court declined to review a denial of partial motions for summary 
judgment because "[a]t trial, [the moving party] had the 
opportunity to fully litigate the issues raised in the summary 
judgment motions." Id. H 19. Specifically, the moving party 
"was allowed to present his evidence and argument on the issues." 
Id. The supreme court reasoned that "[i]n appealing a summary 
judgment ruling, only facts and legal theories that were 
foreclosed from being addressed at trial may be heard on appeal." 
Id. f 20. Thus, our case law suggests that only the legal issues 
decided by the denial of summary judgment that prevented a party 
from dealing with the issue at trial will be considered after a 
trial on the merits. 
Kl4 We conclude that the denial of the motion for summary 
judgment is not appealable under prior Utah case law and the 
facts of this case. The issue of proximate cause and negligence 
were presented to the jury and decided against Hanson. 
1. (...continued) 
reversible error when the case has proceeded to trial and has 
been determined on the merits by the trier of the facts . . . ." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Ondrusek v. Murphy, 
120 P.3d 1053, 1055-56 & n.2 (Alaska 2005) (reviewing a summary 
judgment denial, but noting that although the Alaska Supreme 
Court "has reviewed summary judgment denials" in the past, it 
would "give serious consideration in the future to adoption of 
what seems to be the majority view concerning reviewability of 
summary judgment denials"). 
2. See, e.g., Wiles v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 173 F.3d 1297, 
1301 (10th Cir. 1999); Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc., 
Ill F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1997); Regency Commercial Assocs. 
v. Lopax, Inc., 869 N.E.2d 310, 320 (111. App. Ct. 2007); 
Gallegos v. New Mexico Bd. of Educ. , 1997-NMCA-40, 1) 8, 123 N.M. 
362, 940 P.2d 468. 
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Certainly, the trial court did not err in declining to rule as a 
matter of law that Hanson's negligence was not a proximate cause 
of Normandeau's death. The issue of duty, though technically an 
issue of law, is heavily fact-sensitive and is intertwined with 
the issue of forseeability, which was also presented to the jury 
and decided against Hanson. Indeed, Hanson "was accorded the 
opportunity to fully litigate [its] case." See id. Finally, and 
most importantly, there was nothing preventing Hanson from making 
a motion to dismiss at trial on the issue of duty, thus 
preserving this issue for appeal. "Consequently, the trial 
court's . . . denial[] of . . . summary judgment resulted in no 
prejudice[ and] did not affect the final outcome . . . ." Id. 
Therefore, we do not review the denial of Hanson's motion for 
summary j udgment. 
II. Jury Instructions 
fl5 Hanson next argues that the trial court €>rred by refusing to 
give its requested jury instruction regarding ITEC's negligent 
design of the truck's hydraulic system. Hanson requested that 
the jury be instructed on negligent design law and that ITEC be 
listed on the special verdict form as a possible negligent party 
and intervening cause. Hanson submitted Model Utah Jury 
Instruction (MUJI) 12.16, which provides: "The manufacturer of a 
product that is reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently 
made has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design of the 
product, so that the product may be safely used in a manner and 
for a purpose for which it was made." However, the trial court 
did not include MUJI 12.16 with the other jury instructions. 
fl6 We review a challenged jury instruction in context with all 
other jury instructions provided to the jury. See Jensen v. 
Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, % 16, 977 P.2d 474. "'As 
we have repeatedly held, if the jury instructions as a whole 
fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error 
does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing 
alone, is not as accurate as it might have been.'" Id. (quoting 
Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 741 (Utah 1996)) (citation 
omitted). A party is entitled to have the jury instructed on its 
theory of the case if competent evidence is presented at trial to 
support its theory. See Van Erickson v. Sorenson, 877 P.2d 144, 
151 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, it is not entitled to have 
the jury instructed with any particular wording. See id. As 
long as the instructions, read as a whole, fairly instruct the 
jury on applicable law, it is not error to refuse a particular 
instruction. See id. ("'[I]t is not error [for the trial court] 
to refuse a proposed instruction if the point is properly covered 
in the other instructions.'" (quoting State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 
643, 647 (Utah 1982))). 
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fl7 Although MUJI 12.16 was not included in the set of 
instructions given to the jury, the trial court provided 
sufficient jury instructions regarding Hanson's claim that ITEC 
was negligent. For example, in jury instruction 19, the trial 
court told the jury that Hanson "claim[ed] that other persons are 
responsible for . . . Normandeau's death, including [ITEC] (the 
manufacturer of the Ryder truck)" and that Hanson "claim[ed] that 
the negligence of these others was the cause of . . . 
Normandeau's death." 
Hl8 Further, jury instruction 22 read: 
Although [ITEC] and Plaintiffs reached a 
resolution of the issues between them in this 
case, [ITEC] still remains as a Defendant in 
this action. Thus, it will be your duty to 
assess and allocate fault in this matter, 
whether that allocation be against . . . 
Normandeau and/or Hanson . . . and/or against 
[ITEC] . . . . 
And, jury instruction 23 told the jury that "[u]nless otherwise 
stated, all instructions given [to] you govern the case as to 
each Defendant. The mere fact that an accident or injury 
occurred does not support the conclusion that any party was [at] 
fault or negligent." 
ill9 The trial court went on to define negligence and comparative 
negligence without limiting those instructions to Hanson or 
Normandeau, and without excluding ITEC. Jury instruction 38, on 
comparative negligence, stated in part: 
If you decide that more than one person 
was responsible for . . . Normandeau's death, 
you must decide each person's percentage of 
fault. "Fault" means a breach of legal duty 
and includes negligence. This allocation of 
fault must be done on a percentage basis, and 
the total must be 100%. Each person's 
percentage should be based on how much that 
person's fault contributed to . . . 
Normandeau's death. 
1(20 Finally, in jury instruction 45, the court told the jury: 
Hanson . . . and [ITEC] are corporations 
and, as such, can act only through their 
officers and employees, and others designated 
by it as its agents. 
20060723-CA 7 
Any act or omission of an officer, 
employee, or agent of a corporation, in the 
performance of their [sic] duties or within 
the scope of the authority of the officer, 
employees or agent, is the act or omission of 
the corporation. So, if you find that the 
preponderance of the evidence shows that an 
officer, agent, or employee of a particular 
corporation was negligent in performing his 
duties or within the scope of this authority, 
then you must find that particular 
corporation was negligent. 
1(21 These instructions, when read in context with the trial 
court's other jury instructions, adequately informed the jury 
that it could find that ITEC was at fault in causing Normandeau's 
death if ITEC had acted negligently. Counsel for Hanson argued 
to the jury that ITEC was negligent, and the jury rejected those 
arguments. In answer to the specific question, "Was any fault on 
the part of [ITEC] a cause of the death of . . . Normandeau?" the 
jury answered, "No." Therefore, we conclude that the trial court 
did not err in failing to include MUJI 12.16 in the set of 
instructions provided to the jury because the other instructions, 
taken as a whole, adequately instructed the jury regarding ITEC's 
alleged negligence. 
122 Hanson further argues that ITEC should have been listed as a 
potentially negligent party on the special verdict form. 
However, ITEC was listed as a potentially responsible party on 
the special verdict form. Specifically, the special verdict form 
asked the jury, "Was the Defendant [ITEC] strictly liable under 
the facts of this case?" and "Was any fault on the part of [ITEC] 
a cause of the death of . . ., Normandeau?" The jury answered 
"No" to each of these questions. We acknowledge that ITEC was 
listed as a party under a theory of strict liability, and not 
specifically as a party under a theory of negligence. However, 
because ITEC was included as a party on the special verdict form 
and because the jury was asked the general question of whether 
ITEC was the cause of Normandeau's death and the jury answered 
"No," we conclude that any error in not listing ITEC as a 
potentially negligent party was harmless. 
III. Untimely Designation of Expert Witnesses 
and Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine 
f23 Hanson also argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to strike Plaintiffs' untimely designation 
of their towing expert, Jesse A. Enriquez, and that the trial 
court erred when it granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine, which 
sought to limit the opinion testimony of Normandeau's supervisor 
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and co-worker. We conclude that both of these rulings were 
within the trial courtfs discretion. 
f24 First, under the original scheduling order, the parties were 
to exchange rebuttal expert witnesses by March 11, 2005. The 
trial court later entered a new scheduling order that gave Hanson 
until May 31, 2005, to designate its experts. The revised 
schedule did not contain any date for rebuttal expert 
designations, and Hanson did not designate any experts before it 
moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs claim that Enriquez was a 
rebuttal expert who was used to respond to Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment. Upon receiving Enriquez's affidavit, served in 
conjunction with Plaintiff's opposition to Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment, Hanson moved to strike the affidavit on the 
grounds that Enriquez was not timely designated as an expert. 
After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Hanson's 
motion and allowed Plaintiffs to designate Enriquez. It also 
allowed Hanson to depose Enriquez and to designate its own towing 
expert. Hanson then hired LaMar McQuaid, a towing expert, who 
testified at trial on behalf of Hanson. 
f25 We conclude that the trial court was within its discretion 
to allow Plaintiffs to designate Enriquez as a towing expert and 
to allow his testimony as a response to Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment. "A trial court has necessary discretion in 
managing cases by pretrial scheduling and management 
conferences." DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1361 
(Utah 1994); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 16 ("[T]he court, upon its 
own motion or upon the motion of a party, may conduct a 
scheduling and management conference."). "Because the trial 
judge deals primarily with the parties and the discovery process, 
he or she has great latitude in determining the most efficient 
and fair manner to conduct the court's business." A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87, 
1 36, 977 P.2d 518. This includes "discretion in determining 
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants sanction," 
id., such as striking Enriquez's expert affidavit, see Utah Pep't 
of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995) (recognizing 
that "[t]he striking of pleadings . . . [is one of] the most 
severe of the potential sanctions that can be imposed upon a 
. . . party"). 
%26 Assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiffs' designation of 
Enriquez as an expert was untimely and that Plaintiffs therefore 
violated the scheduling order, Hanson was not prejudiced by any 
such untimely designation because the trial court gave Hanson an 
opportunity to depose Enriquez and to designate its own towing 
expert. See, e.g., A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing, 1999 UT App 87, 
il 37. Moreover, the designation of the towing experts came well 
in advance of trial. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 
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allowing Plaintiffs1 designation of Enriquez as a towing expert. 
See id. 
f27 Hanson further argues that the trial court erred when it 
granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine, which sought to limit the 
opinion testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker. 
However, Hanson failed to provide an adequate record to enable 
this court to review the trial court's ruling. In their motion 
in limine, Plaintiffs argued that the trial court should preclude 
Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker from expressing opinions 
about the cause of and the responsibility for Normandeau's 
accident. Plaintiffs asserted that Normandeau's supervisor and 
co-worker were lay witnesses whose opinions were based on 
personal perception, lacked foundation, required speculation, 
stated legal conclusions, invaded the province of the jury, and 
would not assist the trier of fact. Hanson responded by arguing 
that Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker provided expert 
testimony and that Plaintiffs are not prejudiced by these 
individuals providing such expert testimony. 
U28 On January 30, 2 006, a hearing was held concerning 
Plaintiffs' motion in limine. However, the record before us 
provides no transcript of that hearing. Instead, we are only 
provided with the minutes, which state that a motion in limine 
was argued and that "[t]he [c]ourt rule[d] as stated on the 
record." This statement does not provide us with the facts the 
trial court considered in making its ruling, the trial court's 
basis for granting Plaintiffs' motion in limine, or the trial 
court's findings and legal conclusions. The only information 
concerning Plaintiffs' motion in limine that the record provides 
is that the trial court did, in fact, grant Plaintiff's motion. 
H2 9 If a party fails to provide an adequate record, we will 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below. See State v. 
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Moreover, we 
note that "'a trial judge is accorded broad discretion in 
determining how a trial shall proceed in his or her courtroom.'" 
Tschaggenv v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, % 16, 163 P.3d 615 
(quoting University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 
633 (Utah 1987)). As such, we conclude that the trial court was 
within its discretion when it granted Plaintiffs' motion in 
limine regarding the testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and co-
worker. See id. (holding that "a trial court is free . . . to 
alter a previous in limine ruling, . . . [and to] exercise its 
discretion to disregard motions to reconsider prior in limine 
rulings" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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IV. Improper Closing Argument 
i[30 Finally, Hanson argues that the trial court erred when it 
denied Hanson's motion for a new trial because of allegedly 
improper and prejudicial remarks Plaintiffs' counsel made in his 
closing arguments. However, Hanson did not timely object to 
these statements at trial. "Absent an objection by [a] 
defendant, we will presume waiver of all arguments regarding the 
appropriateness of counsel's statements unless the error falls 
into the category of plain error." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 
P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). Hanson does not argue plain error, 
nor do we find any plain error regarding Plaintiffs' counsel's 
closing argument. Therefore, we do not address Hanson's argument 
that Plaintiffs' attorney made improper statements during closing 
argument. 
CONCLUSION 
f31 Regarding Hanson's argument that the trial court erred in 
denying its summary judgment motion, we conclude that such a 
denial is not appealable under the facts of this case. 
Therefore, we do not address it. We further conclude that the 
trial court's jury instructions were proper and adequately 
informed the jury of the law concerning Hanson's defense. 
Moreover, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it allowed the designation of Plaintiffs' expert 
and granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine. Finally, we do not 
address Hanson's claim that Plaintiffs' counsel's closing 
arguments were improper because Hanson failed to object to them 
at trial. 
^32 Accordingly, we affirm. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
H33 I CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
20060723-CA 11 
ORME, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
i[34 I concur in the balance of the opinion, but I disagree with 
my colleagues that there is appellate jurisdiction over only some 
denials of summary judgment. I believe that once a final 
judgment has been entered, we have jurisdiction over appeals 
questioning the denial of a motion for summary judgment 
regardless of the basis for the denial, although I recognize that 
such appeals will ordinarily be for naught as a practical matter. 
^35 Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, Utah 
recognizes that when a party complies with rule 3(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and designates the final judgment 
in its notice of appeal, it is "not precluded from alleging 
errors in any intermediate order involving the merits or 
necessarily affecting the judgment as long as such errors were 
properly preserved.1'1 Zion's First Nat' 1 Bank v. Rocky Mountain 
Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1997). On the 
contrary, "[w]hen an appellant files a notice of appeal from a 
final judgment, he may, in his opening brief, challenge all 
nonfinal prior orders and happenings which led up to that final 
judgment." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Professors Wright and Miller specifically recognize that this 
familiar precept applies to denials of summary judgment. See 10A 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2715, at 264-66 (3d ed. 1998) 
1. I readily agree with the majority that a denial of summary 
judgment, an intermediate order, is not immediately appealable as 
a matter of right. See Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, % 20 & 
n.13, 144 P.3d 1147. While a party may petition to have the 
denial considered on interlocutory appeal, it is not required to 
do so. See generally Utah R. App. P. 5(a). Utah has a long 
history of discouraging piecemeal appeals and favoring a single 
appeal from a single action, see, e.g., Anderson v. Wilshire 
Invs., LLC, 2005 UT 59, % 9, 123 P.3d 393; Miller v. USAA Cas. 
Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, % 68, 44 P.3d 663; Kennedy v. New Era 
Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 1979); O'Qara v. Findlay, 7 
Utah 2d 218, 321 P.2d 953, 953-54 (1958), and only rarely will an 
interlocutory appeal be granted from the denial of a summary 
judgment motion. When leave is not sought or when it is sought 
but denied, the question of whether the intermediate order was 
erroneous does not vaporize but is simply pushed forward for 
possible consideration after the entry of final judgment. 
Adherence to this precept both serves the policy in favor of one 
appeal per case and assures litigants there is no need to seek 
appeal of every intermediate disposition along the way, as their 
right to fuss about such dispositions will be fully preserved for 
appeal following the entry of final judgment. 
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("[After] entry of judgment following the trial on the merits, 
. . . the party who unsuccessfully sought summary judgment may 
argue that the trial court's denial of the Rule 56 motion was 
erroneous.") (footnotes omitted).2 
f36 What I have said goes only to jurisdiction--to the power of 
an appellate court to consider all interlocutory orders on appeal 
from a final judgment, including interlocutory orders denying 
summary judgment motions. I do not mean to suggest that such 
challenges are likely to be successful. Indeed, as a practical 
matter, it will be hard for a party to argue entitlement to 
judgment as a matter of law when judge or jury, having heard all 
the evidence and seen live witnesses, actually awarded judgment 
to the other side. In such a case, the appealing party is 
fighting an impossible battle in the absence of a mistake of law 
impacting the judgment entered. Even in the case where denial of 
a summary judgment motion turns exclusively on a legal issue, it 
will ordinarily be more efficient to reassert that legal issue in 
the context of a motion to dismiss at the close of the 
plaintiff's case, a motion for directed verdict, a challenge to 
the trial court's instructions to the jury, etc.--and to seek 
2. The majority relies upon Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 144 
P.3d 1147, in concluding that in Utah "only the legal issues 
decided by the denial of summary judgment that prevented a party 
from dealing with the issue at trial will be considered after a 
trial on the merits." Lead Opinion H 13. In Wavment, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "only facts and legal theories that were 
foreclosed [by a summary judgment ruling] from being addressed at 
trial may be heard on appeal," 2006 UT 56, \ 20 (emphasis in 
original), but it cited no authority in support of that 
pronouncement, it did not characterize the limitation as 
jurisdictional, and it did not cross-reference the general rule 
set forth in Zion's First National Bank v. Rocky Mountain 
Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142 (Utah 1997), which I quote in % 35 
of this opinion. Thus, it seems entirely possible that the Court 
had in mind the same kind of practical inefficacy of such a 
challenge on appeal that I readily recognize, rather than a true 
jurisdictional bar. 
The majority also relies upon Estate Landscape & Snow 
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), where the Supreme Court 
did review a denial of summary judgment, see id. at 325-31, but 
such reliance is misplaced. The Supreme Court's only relevant 
references were with respect to its determination of the 
appropriate standards of review. See id. at 326 ("Because he was 
dealing with undisputed facts, [the trial judge]'s denial of 
summary judgment amounted to a ruling of law, which we review for 
correctness[.]"). 
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appellate consideration of the trial court's pertinent rulings--
than to overtly challenge the trial court's earlier denial of 
summary judgment. But such barriers to success on appeal from a 
denial of summary judgment are practical, not jurisdictional. 
Accordingly, I believe that Hanson was free to raise its 
challenge to the trial court's denial of its motion for summary 
judgment and that we are obliged to consider that challenge on 
its merits, such as they are. 
i|37 On the merits, I cannot say that the trial court erred in 
denying Hanson's summary judgment motion. Hanson's moving papers 
failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Hanson owed no duty 
of care to Normandeau, that Hanson's repair did not proximately 
cause Normandeau's death, or that Normandeau was negligent in 
preparing the truck for towing. Accordingly, the trial court 
ruled correctly in denying the motion. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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WILKINS, Justice: 
fl Plaintiff Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler ("Prince Yeates" or "the 
firm") appeals the district court's denial of the firm's motion for 
summary judgment on defendant Robert S. Young's counterclaim for 
breach of express contract and its grant of partial summary judgment 
to Young on the firm's breach of fiduciary duty claim. We reverse. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
%2 In April 1995, Prince Yeates hired Young as an associate 
attorney. Previously, Young had spent the majority of his twelve-year 
legal career as general counsel for Rocky Mountain Helicopters, where 
he acquired considerable experience in helicopter crash litigation. 
Prior to joining Prince Yeates, Young met with John Ashton, the 
firm's then-president, to discuss compensation. Under the terms of 
his original employment agreement, which was never reduced to 
writing, Young accepted a starting salary of $70,000 per year. During 
their discussions, Ashton also indicated to Young that the firm would 
evaluate his performance after the first year and that, as a general 
rule, attorneys at Prince Yeates typically received increased 
compensation based on performance and positive results. In addition, 
with respect to becoming a shareholder, Ashton told Young that, 
depending upon his performance, the usual partnership track for a 
lateral hire with Young's experience ranged from two to three years. 
f3 In 1996, Young agreed to represent Charles Krause, who had 
sustained serious injuries in a helicopter crash, in a personal 
injury action in Texas. At approximately the same time, Young also 
undertook the representation of Mountain West Helicopters, the owner 
of the helicopter involved in Krause's accident, in a related lawsuit 
filed in federal court in Utah. As well as being the originating 
attorney, Young was the only lawyer at Prince Yeates who performed 
any work on either case. 
f4 For the next two years, Young spent considerable time on these 
two contingent fee cases, which resulted in lower collections and 
higher work-in-process figures compared to other Prince Yeates 
attorneys. As a result, some members of the firm began to question 
Young's overall profitability and readiness to become a shareholder. 
In September 1998, perhaps sensing this tension, Young inquired as to 
how the contingent fee in the Krause case (assuming a successful 
outcome) would be divided between himself and Prince Yeates. The 
firm's Board of Directors ("the Board") responded by assigning Ashton 
and John Chindlund, Prince Yeates1 then-president, to explore the 
possibility of reaching an agreement with Young on the Krause fee. 
%5 Between December 1998 and May 1999, Ashton and Chindlund met 
with Young on several occasions to negotiate an appropriate 
allocation of the Krause fee. Throughout these meetings, both Prince 
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Yeates (represented by Ashton and Chindlund) and Young communicated 
their intention to be "fair" with each other in attempting to 
determine the amount of "fair and equitable" compensation that Young 
would receive from the Krause fee. Ultimately, the two parties 
reached a tentative verbal agreement under which Young would take 
one-third of the Krause fee, with the remaining two-thirds going to 
the firm. On May 5, 1999, Chindlund memorialized this proposal in 
writing and requested that Young sign it to acknowledge his 
acceptance. Young did not sign. 
%6 On June 14, 1999, Young learned that the Krause case had 
settled three days earlier at a mediation in Texas, which he did not 
attend, and that the contingent fee recovery would be nearly 
$650,000. The following day, June 15, without disclosing his 
knowledge of the settlement to his employer, Young made a 
counteroffer to the firm's May 5 proposal. In his counteroffer, Young 
agreed to divide the Krause fee one-third to himself and two-thirds 
to the firm, provided Prince Yeates made him a shareholder, allowed 
him a voice in that year's bonus distribution, and guaranteed an 
increased salary for the next two years. According to Young, over the 
course of their numerous meetings, Ashton and Chindlund promised him 
that the firm would fulfill these additional conditions upon the 
successful resolution of the Krause case. Ashton and Chindlund denied 
making such promises, and the firm did not respond to Young's 
proposal. Finally, on July 2, Young wrote a memo to the Board, 
informing them that he would leave Prince Yeates in two weeks if an 
agreement could not be reached on his counteroffer. The firm accepted 
Young's resignation on July 7. 
i|7 After his departure, Prince Yeates learned that Young had 
represented certain clients during 1998 and 1999 without disclosing 
the representation to the firm, while simultaneously using firm 
resources and filing pleadings in the firm's name in connection with 
these matters. In addition, Young retained all fees derived from 
these cases for himself. Prince Yeates then filed suit against Young 
for breach of fiduciary duty, and Young counterclaimed alleging, 
among other causes of action, breach of oral contract. The firm twice 
moved for summary judgment on Young's counterclaim, and the district 
court denied both motions with respect to the contract claims. Prince 
Yeates and Young also each moved for partial summary judgment on the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim. The district court denied the firm's 
motion, granted Young's, and the case proceeded to trial. 
f8 At trial, the special verdict form asked the jury to determine 
if Young "was entitled to additional compensation as a result of the 
Krause fee either under his original oral employment contract or a 
valid contract with regard to the helicopter cases." The jury 
answered in the affirmative and determined that $280,000 represented 
"the fair and reasonable amount of the fee" owed to Young. 
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%9 On appeal, Prince Yeates challenges (1) the district court's 
denial of its two summary judgment motions on Young's breach of 
contract counterclaim; (2) the district court's grant of partial 
summary judgment to Young and denial of partial summary judgment to 
the firm on its breach of fiduciary duty claim; (3) the district 
court's denial of Prince Yeates' motion for a directed verdict on the 
counterclaim; (4) the sufficiency of the evidence presented by Young 
to support the jury verdict; and (5) the district court's refusal to 
allow the firm to introduce evidence of Young's competing law 
practice. On cross-appeal, Young asserts that the district court 
erred when it denied his post-trial request for attorney fees, 
expenses, and prejudgment interest. Because the case is fully 
resolved by our analysis of the district court's summary judgment 
rulings, we do not address the other issues raised. 
ANALYSIS 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
tlO We review the district court's rulings on summary judgment 
motions for correctness. Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 
2000 UT 71, fl 14, 10 P.3d 338; see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In the 
context of cross-motions for summary judgment, we examine each motion 
separately, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Surety 
Underwriters, 2000 UT 71 at f 15. 
II. BREACH OF EXPRESS CONTRACT 
fll Young asserts that Prince Yeates entered into two separate 
express contracts with him: (1) the original 1995 oral employment 
agreement; and (2) the discussions between Ashton, Chindlund, and 
Young regarding the "fair and equitable" division of the Krause fee. 
We review each in turn. 
A. The Original Employment Agreement 
1[l2 Under the terms of his original oral employment agreement, 
Young accepted Prince Yeates' offer to become an associate attorney 
at a starting salary of $70,000 per year. In previous conversations, 
Ashton indicated to Young that, as a general rule, attorneys at the 
firm typically received increased compensation based on performance, 
and that the usual shareholder track for a lateral hire with Young's 
experience ranged from two to three years. Although nothing was ever 
reduced to writing, Young claims that these representations created 
an express contract under which Prince Yeates agreed to pay him 
additional compensation contingent upon positive performance. Young 
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then argues that his recovery of the Krause fee constitutes 
contractual performance sufficient to warrant increased remuneration. 
We disagree. 
fl3 In Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, we noted that ,!la meeting of the 
minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the 
formation of a contract'" and, consequently, "'[a]n agreement cannot 
be enforced if its terms are indefinite.1" 2003 UT 37, f 11, 78 P.3d 
600 (quoting Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 
1996)) . Here, Ashton and Young discussed the general relationship 
between performance and compensation at Prince Yeates. At no point in 
these conversations did Ashton represent to Young that the firm would 
pay him a specific amount of additional compensation in the future, 
or that Young was guaranteed to become a shareholder. Furthermore, 
Ashton never provided, nor did Young ask for, clarification on what 
exactly constituted "performance" sufficient to trigger increased 
compensation. Rather, Ashton merely communicated Prince Yeates' usual 
practice; namely, that as a general rule, attorneys at the firm 
typically received additional compensation if they performed well. 
fl4 Without some definite language addressing the amount, timing, 
or conditions of Young's potential additional compensation, Ashton1s 
comments represent "only the facade of a promise, . . . statement[s] 
made in such vague or conditional terms that the person making [them] 
commits himself to nothing." Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & 
Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). Such statements 
"neither bind[] the person making [them] . . . nor function[] as 
consideration for a return promise." Id. In short, "where there was 
simply some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be 
entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of a 
contract the parties ought to have made and enforce it." Valcarce v. 
Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Utah 1961) . Therefore, based upon the 
uncontested material facts viewed in the light most favorable to 
Young, we hold as a matter of law that Ashton's broad, indefinite 
statements to Young pertaining to the general relationship between 
performance and compensation did not create an express contract 
binding Prince Yeates to pay Young greater compensation, or advance 
him to shareholder status. As a result, the district court erred when 
it denied Prince Yeates summary judgment on Young's counterclaim. 
B. The Krause Fee Discussions 
fl5 In addition, Young also contends that Prince Yeates entered 
into a second express contract when Ashton and Chindlund communicated 
the firm's intention to be "fair" in negotiating the amount of "fair 
and equitable" compensation that he would receive from the Krause 
fee. Again, we disagree. 
fl6 Like his earlier argument on the original employment 
agreement, Young's claim fails because the firm's statements 
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regarding the anticipated "fair and equitable" division of the Krause 
fee were too indefinite to create an express contract. Our prior 
jurisprudence clearly establishes that a contract cannot exist 
without a meeting of the minds on the central features of the 
agreement. See Nielsen, 2003 UT 37 at f 11; Tsern, 928 P.2d at 373. 
Simply stated, "[a] condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, 
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with 
sufficient definiteness to be enforced." Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428. 
fl7 Here, although Prince Yeates and Young each expressed their 
intention to allocate the Krause fee in a "fair and equitable" 
manner, no agreement was ever reached on the integral feature of the 
alleged contract--Youngfs compensation. Other than the tentative one-
third/ two-thirds division outlined in Chindlundfs May 5, 1999 memo, 
which Young expressly rejected with his counteroffer, the parties 
never agreed upon the specific amount of, or formula to determine, 
Young's share of the Krause fee. In the absence of any consensus on 
actual numbers or adoption of a mutually satisfactory method of 
calculating "fair and equitable" compensation, Prince Yeates1 stated 
desire to be "fair" to Young, standing alone, is too indefinite to 
create a contractual obligation. "So long as there is any uncertainty 
or indefiniteness, or future negotiations or considerations to be had 
between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, 
there is no contract at all." Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101, 1102 
(Utah 1926). See also Tsern, 928 P.2d at 373-74 (noting that "when 
parties have not agreed on a reasonable price or a method for 
determining one, 'the agreement is too indefinite and uncertain for 
enforcement'" (quoting 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 4.3 
(rev. ed. 1993))). Other jurisdictions also take this approach. See 
Freedman v. Pearlman, 706 N.Y.S.2d 405, 407-08 (App. Div. 2000) 
(holding that "alleged promises . . . to provide 'fair compensation' 
and to 'equitably' divide the draw were too indefinite to be 
enforced"); Turcott v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 179 A.2d 491, 492-93 (R.I. 
1962) (same). 
fl8 In sum, Prince Yeates' commitment to be "fair" to Young in 
attempting to determine his "fair and equitable" compensation from 
the Krause fee was too indefinite to create an express contract. 
Again, viewing the material facts in the light most favorable to 
Young, we reverse the district court and hold, as a matter of law, 
that Prince Yeates was entitled to summary judgment on Young's 
counterclaim. 
III. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
J^l9 Prince Yeates next argues that Young breached his fiduciary 
duty of loyalty--specifically, a duty of non-competition--when he 
represented clients in the firm's name without disclosing the 
representation to the firm, expended firm resources and filed 
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pleadings in the firm's name in connection with these matters, and 
retained all fees derived from these cases for himself. x' The 
district court denied Prince Yeates' motion for partial summary 
judgment on the issue of liability and granted Young's cross-motion, 
reasoning that, as a mere employee, he owed no fiduciary duty of non-
competition to the firm. Once more, we disagree. 
f20 As a general matter, the second Restatement of Agency provides 
that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty not to 
compete with the principal concerning the subject matter of his 
agency." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 393 (1958). Furthermore, 
"[t]he rules as to the duties and liabilities to the principal of 
agents who are not servants [also] apply to servants." Id. at § 429. 
While the Restatement does not specifically include "employees" as 
"agents," it does refer to "servants," a term synonymous with 
"employees." See Black's Law Dictionary 1372 (7th ed. 1999) (defining 
"servant" by pointing to the definition of "employee"). 
f21 Although this court has not directly addressed the issue of 
whether "mere employees" owe their employers a fiduciary duty of non-
competition, other jurisdictions have. In Fryetech, Inc. v. Harris, 
the defendants argued that the fiduciary duties of good faith and 
loyalty did not apply to "mere employees." 46 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1152 
(D. Kan. 1999). The court rejected this contention, emphasizing that 
"[w]hile most of the cases which have addressed the fiduciary 
responsibilities of agents . . . have involved corporate directors or 
officers, there is no basis for concluding these are the only types 
of agents subject to fiduciary duties." Id. Rather, "the cases speak 
of the duties of agents without respect to their exact status." Id.; 
see also Bessman v. Bessman, 520 P.2d 1210, 1217 (Kan. 1974) ("An 
agent or employee of another is prohibited from acting in any manner 
inconsistent with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to 
exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of his 
duties." (internal quotations omitted)); Chernow v. Reyes, 570 A.2d 
1282, 1283, 1284 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that even 
though an employee's oral employment contract did not specifically 
prohibit competition, "[a]n employee owes a duty of loyalty to the 
employer and must not, while employed, act contrary to the employer's 
interest," which necessarily includes "a duty not to compete with the 
employer's business"). 
i|22 In response, Young cites Microbiological Research Corp. v. 
Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981), ostensibly for the proposition that, 
under Utah law, "mere employees" owe no fiduciary duties to their 
employers. Young misreads Muna. This court in Muna noted that when a 
corporate officer no longer serves in that capacity due to 
resignation or removal, but remains as an employee, the fiduciary 
relationship may cease, depending on the factual circumstances. 625 
P.2d at 695. However, it is incorrect to conclude, as Young does, 
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that this observation somehow inevitably leads to the conclusion that 
employees necessarily have no fiduciary duties to their employers.(2) 
That is not the case. Moreover, Young cites no additional applicable 
law from this or any other jurisdiction. 
%22 In the relationship of a lawyer and his or her employer, there 
does exist a duty of honest and ethical behavior. Because of the 
privilege granted to engage in the practice of law, we impose upon 
members of our bar a fiduciary duty that encompasses the obligation 
to not compete with their employer, which we define as any law firm 
or legal services provider who may employ them in a legal capacity, 
without the employer's prior knowledge and agreement. 
f24 We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that the district court 
erred in denying Prince Yeates' motion for partial summary judgment 
on its breach of fiduciary duty claim and in granting Youngfs cross-
motion. To hold otherwise would imply that attorneys are free to join 
law firms, derive benefits from that association, and essentially 
operate as sole practitioners while simultaneously receiving a salary 
and using firm resources for their independent legal activities. If 
Young was unhappy at Prince Yeates, he was free, as an at-will 
employee, to leave at any time and presumably take those clients who 
wished to follow him. Merely because he was afraid that his interest 
in the Krause fee would be jeopardized does not justify his non-
disclosure of representation and subsequent retention of fees. He had 
a higher duty to Prince Yeates than that. With that in mind, we now 
turn to the question of the firm's remedy. 
IV. REMEDY 
f25 Regarding an appropriate remedy, Prince Yeates urges us to 
require the forfeiture of both Young's share of the Krause fee 
(determined by the jury to be $280,000) and all compensation paid by 
the firm to Young from January 26, 1998 through July 7, 1999--the 
time period during which Young breached his fiduciary duty of non-
competition. To support this argument, Prince Yeates cites several 
cases from other jurisdictions where courts imposed total forfeiture 
upon disloyal employees. See, e.g., Bon Temps Agency Ltd. v. 
Greenfield, 584 N.Y.S.2d 824, 825-26 (App. Div. 1992); Vendo Co. v. 
Stoner, 321 N.E.2d 1, 14 (111. 1974). 
%2G Although we acknowledge that total forfeiture may be proper in 
certain circumstances, we decline to implement such a harsh remedy in 
this case. Given that the number of undisclosed clients and the 
amount of retained fees were comparatively small, Young's conduct, 
while unquestionably giving rise to liability, does not warrant so 
punitive a sanction. Moreover, with our reversal today of the summary 
judgment rulings already described, Young has no share of the Krause 
fee to forfeit, due in no small part to Young's own lack of honesty 
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and candor with Prince Yeates when the Krause case was settled. 
However, we do hold that the appropriate remedy for Young's breach of 
fiduciary duty is the disgorgement of the fees charged and collected 
by Young while employed at the firm but not previously paid over to 
Prince Yeates. As such, we remand this issue to the district court, 
with instructions to determine the amount of those fees and order 
their payment to the firm forthwith. 
CONCLUSION 
%21 We reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment to 
Prince Yeates on Young's counterclaim for breach of express contract. 
With respect to the original employment agreement, we hold that 
Ashton's statements to Young addressing the general relationship 
between performance and compensation were too indefinite to create an 
enforceable contract term. Likewise, Prince Yeates1 commitment to be 
"fair" to Young in determining his "fair and equitable" compensation 
from the Krause fee was similarly indefinite, and therefore 
insufficient to give rise to an enforceable contract. 
f28 Secondly, we reverse the district court's denial of the firm's 
partial summary judgment motion on the issue of liability for breach 
of fiduciary duty, and its attendant grant of Young's cross-motion. 
We hold that Young breached his fiduciary duty of non-competition 
when he represented clients without disclosing the representation to 
Prince Yeates, expended firm resources and filed pleadings in the 
firm's name in connection with these matters, and retained all fees 
derived from these cases for himself. As such, we further hold that 
the appropriate remedy for Young's breach is the disgorgement of 
those ill-gotten fees to Prince Yeates. We reverse and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
f2 9 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice 
Parrish, and Judge Mclff concur in Justice Wilkins' opinion. 
1f30 Having disqualified himself, Justice Nehring does not 
participate herein; District Judge K. L. Mclff sat. 
1. In addition, by invoking Prince Yeates' name, Young also 
effectively made the firm liable for any professional liability 
arising from the representation. 
2. We need not, and do not, decide today whether all "mere employees" 
owe fiduciary duties to their employers to not compete with the 
employer's legitimate business interests. 
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NEHRING, Justice: 
%1 When Ali Yazd and Parvin Yousefi's Lindon, Utah home 
sank into the unstable soil upon which it lay, they sued. They 
claimed that home-seller Woodside Homes fraudulently concealed 
information contained in a report, the "Delta report," about a 
deep layer of collapsible soil present on land that Woodside 
owned adjacent to the Yazd-Yousefi property. 
%2 The district court granted Woodside's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed the Yazd-Yousefi fraudulent 
concealment claims. It based its ruling on the undisputed fact 
that Woodside was unaware of unsuitable soil conditions either on 
the Yazd-Yousefi land or elsewhere in its development. The court 
of appeals reversed. 
%3 We granted certiorari. We affirm the court of appeals' 
reversal of summary judgment. However, we reverse the court of 
appeals' holding that the Delta report was material as a matter 
of law. We also correct the court of appeals' misapprehension 
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that the materiality of the Delta report is relevant to whether 
Woodside owed the homeowners a duty to disclose the contents to 
them. Finally, we hold that a developer-builder may owe his 
buyer a duty to disclose information known to him about the 
composition or characteristics of any real property when that 
information is material to the suitability of the property 
purchased by the buyer. 
BACKGROUND 
f4 In the early 1990s, Woodside undertook the development 
of the Panorama Point subdivision in Lindon, Utah. The 
subdivision included three parcels of land, the last of which was 
purchased in 1992 from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, which we will call the "Church." The Church had intended 
to construct a large structure on the property. The Church 
abandoned this plan, however, after the Delta report (named after 
the firm which compiled it) revealed that an excess of moisture-
sensitive collapsible soil made the site unsuitable for the 
contemplated building. The Delta report did not specifically 
evaluate the suitability of the site for a single family 
residence. 
f5 The Church agreed to sell the parcel of property to 
Woodside. According to the sales contract, the Church was to 
provide a copy of the Delta report to Woodside. Woodside claims 
it never saw the report. 
f6 Before the Yazd-Yousefi home was built, Woodside 
obtained its own study of the soil conditions on two other 
parcels that comprised Panorama Point. The Yazd-Yousefi lot was 
within the area covered by the study. The soil study indicated 
the presence of collapsible soil to an average depth of 
approximately two and one-half feet. Accordingly, Woodside 
formulated a plan to dig out the collapsible soil and reduce the 
grade of these parcels between six and eight feet. After the 
work was completed, William Gordon, an engineer, inspected the 
area at the behest of Woodside and pronounced the soil fit to 
support a house. In 1995, Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi contracted 
with Woodside to purchase a lot and build a home in Panorama 
Point. Woodside did not disclose the contents of the Delta or 
Woodside's own soil reports to Mr. Yazd or Ms. Yousefi. 
%1 Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi moved into their home in 
September 1995. By 1996, cracks appeared in the foundation and 
the driveway. Doors would not open or close. Evidence of 
excessive settling abounded. Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi accepted 
Woodside's efforts to repair the damage until April 2002 when a 
prospective purchaser of the home discovered that, owing to the 
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instability of the soil, major repairs would be required to 
shore-up the house and prevent additional damage. 
i[8 With this discovery, Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi decided 
to seek legal relief. They sued Woodside. They alleged that 
Woodside's failure to disclose the presence of the collapsible 
soil in the area amounted to a breach of contract and fraudulent 
nondisclosure. The district court referred the Yazd-Yousefi 
contract claims to arbitration; these claims do not concern us 
here. The district court then dismissed the Yazd-Yousefi 
fraudulent nondisclosure and concealment claims. The district 
court based its ruling on a determination that Woodside had 
neither real nor constructive knowledge of the continued presence 
of collapsible soil on the buyers' lot. 
1(9 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded 
the case to the district court. The court of appeals concluded 
that the Delta report did contain material information that 
Woodside had a duty to disclose to the buyers and, since the 
question of whether Woodside actually had knowledge of the report 
was in dispute, that summary judgment was improperly granted. 
ANALYSIS 
flO In order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent 
concealment, a plaintiff must prove w(l) that the nondisclosed 
information is material, (2) that the nondisclosed information is 
known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) that there is a 
legal duty to communicate." Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, 
1 9, 31 P.3d 572. These elements are presented in inverse order 
of importance. As we will see, this reverse ordering of elements 
may have led the court of appeals to apply a flawed analytical 
process that nevertheless yielded the correct result: a reversal 
of the district court. 
I. WOODSIDE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MR. YAZD AND MS. YOUSEFI CREATED 
A LEGAL DUTY 
^11 We have stated that u[i]t is axiomatic that one may not 
be liable to another in tort absent a duty." Loveland v. Orem 
City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1987). Any analysis of a 
tort claim, then, begins with an inquiry into the existence and 
scope of the duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant. 
fl2 The court of appeals, however, began its analysis by 
examining the materiality of the Delta report following the 
sequence of elements set out in Mitchell. The court of appeals 
then wasted little time reaching the conclusion that M[t]here is 
little question that the information contained in the Delta 
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report would have been material to the Buyers in this case." 
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2005 UT App 82, 1 9, 109 P.3d 393. 
i|l3 With its finding of materiality in hand, the court of 
appeals moved on to the matter of duty. The court appeared to 
link the materiality of the Delta report to the existence of 
Woodside's duty when it stated, uWe can say, however, that if 
Woodside possessed the Delta report, or had knowledge of its 
content, prior to the sale with the Buyers, it had a duty to 
disclose the information to the Buyers." Id. 1 10. It is 
important that the court of appeals' opinion not be read to 
suggest that the materiality of the Delta report created 
Woodside's duty to disclose the contents of the report to 
Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi. Indeed, materiality becomes an issue 
only after a legal duty has been established. 
fl4 The determination of whether a legal duty exists falls 
to the court. It is a purely legal question, and since in the 
absence of a duty a plaintiff will not be entitled to a remedy, 
it is the first question to be answered. See Loveland, 746 P.2d 
at 766. 
1l5 From where does a duty arise? To properly answer the 
duty question, a court must understand that the structure and 
dynamics of the relationship between the parties gives rise to 
the duty. "The question of whether a duty exists is a question 
of law. As always, resolution of this issue begins with an 
examination of the legal relationships between the parties, 
followed by an analysis of the duties created by these 
relationships." Id. 
i|l6 A relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely 
to be accompanied by a duty than one, for example, in which 
parties are in privity of contract. Age, knowledge, influence, 
bargaining power, sophistication, and cognitive ability are but 
the more prominent among a multitude of life circumstances that a 
court may consider in analyzing whether a legal duty is owed by 
one party to another. Where a disparity in one or more of these 
circumstances distorts the balance between the parties in a 
relationship to the degree that one party is exposed to 
unreasonable risk, the law may intervene by creating a duty on 
the advantaged party to conduct itself in a manner that does not 
reward exploitation of its advantage. 
Hl7 Legal duty, then, is the product of policy judgments 
applied to relationships. DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 
1000, 1003-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Duty is not sacrosanct in 
itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
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particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted)). A person who possesses 
important, even vital, information of interest to another has no 
legal duty to communicate the information where no relationship 
between the parties exists. 
fl8 An example which illustrates this point is the "special 
relationship" doctrine in tort law. A person has no legal duty 
to protect another person from the conduct of a stranger unless 
the person upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed has a 
"special relationship" with either the stranger or the potential 
victim. Rather, "[t]he duty to control another person may arise 
where a special relationship exists." Wilson v. Valley Mental 
Health, 969 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 1998); see also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 315 (1977) (stating that a duty is premised 
on a special relationship); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231, 236 (Utah 1993) (adopting Restatement position). Here, it 
is Woodside's status as builder-contractor that gives rise to its 
legal duty to the home buyers. The communication of material 
information to Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi is one of the obligations 
that flow from Woodside's assumption of its legal duty. 
Ul9 There are occasionally instances in which a court is 
called upon to make policy choices based on assessments of 
social, economic, and technological conditions. To cite but one 
example, the maturation of the industrial revolution and, in 
particular, the ever lengthening chain of participants in the 
manufacture of goods cut deeply into the doctrines of caveat 
emptor and privity of contract that had served well an agrarian 
and economically insular nation prior to the last century. This 
changed in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., where Justice Cardozo 
held that manufacturers must exercise reasonable care to protect 
consumers and others who, despite a lack of privity or direct 
contractual contact with the manufacturer, may come into contact 
with their products. 217 N.Y. 382, 390 (1916). 
1(2 0 Typically, courts cede authority over matters of policy 
to the political branches of government. When policy 
considerations bear on a subject lodged firmly within the court's 
sphere, like the common law, it is entirely appropriate for the 
court to make the policy judgments necessary to get the law 
right. 
f21 We have never explicitly recognized that a duty is owed 
to buyers of homes by builder-contractors. Insofar as we have 
signaled a willingness to impose this duty, it has been by 
indirection and expressed in dictum. In Smith v. Frandsen. 2004 
UT 55, H 9, 94 P.3d 919, we turned away an attempt by the Smiths, 
owners of a home that had been constructed on unsuitable soil, to 
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impose a duty on the developer of the subdivision where the home 
was located. Our reasons for doing so had as much to do with the 
conclusions that we reached about the scope of knowledge acquired 
and the responsibility assumed by the Smiths' contractor-builder 
as with the issue of whether the developer knew of the poor soil 
conditions and whether that knowledge was material. 
1(22 Our focus in Smith was not on whether the relationship 
between the Smiths and their builder-contractor imposed a legal 
duty to disclose information about soil conditions. After all, 
the builder-contractor was not a party to the lawsuit. The 
inquiry into the builder-contractor's role was, instead, directed 
at whether parity existed between what the builder-contractor 
knew about the condition of the soil that lay beneath the Smiths' 
house and the developer's knowledge of the same soil instability. 
This was relevant to our analysis of the developer's duty because 
we had formerly indicated that a remote purchaser who had no 
privity of contract with a developer might nevertheless recover 
for breach of the developer's duty to disclose unsuitable soil 
conditions to a previous unsophisticated purchaser who had no 
knowledge of the adverse conditions. Id. % 25. 
U23 Smith required us to define limits on the right to 
recover from remote parties. One limiting principle that we 
recognized and applied in Smith was that a duty to disclose 
material information is extinguished once the information is 
communicated or otherwise acquired by the party to whom the duty 
was owed. Id. |^ 17. 
if24 Modern home construction requires a high degree of 
knowledge and expertise, including knowledge of soil conditions. 
We have found that the disparity in skill and knowledge between 
home buyers and builder-contractors leads buyers to rely on the 
builder-contractor's expertise. Based on these observations, we 
chose to adopt in Loveland, 74 6 P.2d 763, a statement of duty 
borrowed from Wyoming of "'reasonable care to insure that the 
subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of 
ordinary, average dwelling house and he must disclose to his 
purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to 
know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential 
building.'" Id. at 769 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anderson v. 
Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1984)). 
f25 The imposition of this duty had the effect in Smith of 
imputing to the builder-contractor the knowledge of deficient 
soil conditions that the Smiths accused the developer of failing 
to disclose to them. The imputation of this knowledge, however, 
cut off any duty the developer may otherwise have owed to future 
owners of the property, including the Smiths. 
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%26 Although we did not recognize the duty of the builder-
contractor in the context of a direct action for recovery brought 
by a home buyer in Smith, we today extend its application to that 
setting. To do otherwise would fatally undermine the legitimacy 
of our reasoning in Smith. 
II. THE MATERIALITY OF THE DELTA REPORT IS IN DISPUTE AND 
PROPERLY LEFT TO THE FINDER OF FACT TO DETERMINE 
%21 The court of appeals held the Delta report to be 
material as a matter of law. Woodside takes issue with this 
determination for three reasons: the Delta report did not 
concern the Yazd-Yousefi lot, the court of appeals misread the 
Delta report in ways that led it to believe it was relevant to 
the Yazd-Yousefi lot when it was not, and Woodside's soil study 
on the Panorama Point property including the Yazd-Yousefi lot 
superseded any materiality to which the Delta report might make 
claim. 
1f28 We do not believe that the Delta report has earned the 
designation of "material" as a matter of law and therefore 
reverse the court of appeals on this point. Neither do we accept 
Woodside's invitation to stamp the Delta report "immaterial" as a 
matter of law. Rather, we find that the question of the report's 
materiality is best suited for the finder of fact to answer. 
1(29 Woodside's contention that the Delta report cannot be 
material because it describes soil conditions on land other than 
the Yazd-Yousefi lot has little to recommend it. Property 
boundaries are seldom drawn with soil composition in mind, and 
information about the suitability of soil for supporting a 
dwelling would more likely than not be relevant to predicting the 
soil conditions on similar adjacent land. We decline to 
categorically deem immaterial all information concerning property 
not owned by the party affected by unsuitable soil conditions. 
For the purpose of determining materiality in this case, property 
boundaries are legally insignificant. 
i[3 0 Whatever errors in interpreting the Delta report may 
have predisposed the court of appeals to conclude that the report 
was material as a matter of law were not so significant as to 
persuade us to summarily rule the report immaterial. The Delta 
report disclosed soil instability of a magnitude that caused the 
Church to scuttle its building plans for the site. There were no 
obvious physical or topographical features that would distinguish 
the Church parcel from the other portions of Panorama Point. In 
our view, these considerations are sufficient to place the 
question of the Delta report's materiality in dispute. 
7 No. 20050444 
U31 Finally, we reject Woodside's assertion that by 
commissioning its own soil study on property that included the 
Yazd-Yousefi lot, it rendered immaterial all other information 
bearing on the soil conditions at Panorama Point. Woodside 
insists that it had no knowledge of the Delta report. Based on 
this assertion, its soil study was necessarily prepared without 
the benefit of information contained in the Delta report 
concerning conditions on the adjacent parcel. At this stage of 
the litigation, we do not know whether knowledge of soil 
conditions on the Church parcel would have affected the Woodside 
soil report. Certainly, it is possible that it could. If the 
finder of fact were to determine that Woodside knew of the Delta 
report but failed to inform its soils expert of its existence and 
contents, the weight of the Woodside soil report could be 
substantially diminished. 
III. WE REFINE THE DEFINITION OF ''MATERIALITY" IN THE CONTEXT OF 
MATTERS THAT MUST BE COMMUNICATED BY A BUILDER-CONTRACTOR 
1(32 In holding that the Delta report was material as a 
matter of law, the court of appeals relied on a definition of 
materiality as "'something which a buyer or seller of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence would think to be of some importance in 
determining whether to buy or sell.'" Yazd v. Woodside Homes 
Corp., 2005 UT App 82, K 9, 109 P.3d 393 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, % 29, 48 P.3d 235). 
In particular, the court of appeals focused on the word "some" in 
the definition. We confess that "some" as us€>d in our 
description of materiality is ambiguous. When used in a context 
in which additional precision concerning quantity or quality is 
sought, the word "some" is inherently ambiguous. "Some" is a 
word that refers to an unspecified quantity or quality. It is a 
word that diminishes precision, not adds to it. When the young 
man proclaims to his mother-in-law, "That was some dinner," we 
are left with considerable uncertainty about the mother-in-law's 
talents as a chef. We believe that when the court of appeals 
stated that "we cannot say as a matter of law that the 
information would not have been of some interest to the Buyers," 
id., it treated "some" in a way that would permit matters of 
lesser importance to qualify as material. This interpretation is 
not what we intended. 
f33 We take this opportunity to clarify the definition of 
materiality as the term is used as an element of fraudulent 
concealment and fraudulent nondisclosure. We believe that 
requisite clarity can be achieved by deleting the word "some" 
from the definition we adopted in Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, H 29. 
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%3A To be material, the information must be "important." 
Importance, in turn, can be gauged by the degree to which the 
information could be expected to influence the judgment of a 
person buying property or assenting to a particular purchase 
price. In this case, we conclude that a finder of fact could 
reasonably find that the contents of the Delta report meet this 
definition of materiality. Therefore, we decline to pass on the 
status of the Delta report as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
f35 The three elements of fraudulent concealment are best 
described in this order: (1) there is a legal duty to 
communicate information, (2) the nondisclosed information is 
known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) the nondisclosed 
information is material. In this case, these elements are yet to 
be adjudicated and remain to be proved. The most important 
element is the existence of a duty, which arises from the 
relationship between the parties. We hold that a developer-
builder may owe his buyer a duty to disclose information known to 
him concerning real property, including property other than that 
conveyed to the buyer, when that information is material to the 
condition of the property purchased by the buyer. Both knowledge 
of the Delta report and its importance to the buyers remain 
contested factual issues that bear on the existence of a duty. 
Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' reversal of summary 
j udgment. 
f36 Finally, we reverse the court of appeals' holding that 
the Delta report was material as a matter of law. We leave the 
trier of fact to determine whether the Delta report was known to 
Woodside and whether its content was sufficiently important such 
that its disclosure would have influenced the decisions made by 
the buyers with respect to this property. 
13 7 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, 
Justice Durrant, and Judge Christiansen concur in Justice 
Nehring's opinion. 
1(38 Having disqualified herself, Justice Parrish does not 
participate herein; District Judge Terry L. Christiansen sat. 
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